One student of Japan’s security affairs has to bear in mind always that it is not clear what certain policies will the Japanese adopt to provide their country with security. This is not due to the difficulties in getting adequate information from the authorities. The difficulty lies in the blurred minds of the Japanese officials, who, generally speaking, fear from the anarchic nature of international politics and refrain from appropriate behaviors. The new security environment visibly discloses this very fact. And the more complicating and multidimensional components of this environment force Japan to abandon from some habits.
This paper aims at discussing the possible implementations for Japan’s future security policy. In the first part, I am going to set up the characteristics of the present security environment that the Japanese people has to confront. Then the objectives of Japan in such an environment will be introduced. Later, the attitudes of the Japanese policymakers today and in the future in dealing with the existing threats will be argued. The adversities in the Japanese-American relations will be also part of the discussion. The main focus of the paper will be on the North Korea issue since it has the most troublesome and confusing effects on the Japanese public opinion and politicians.
Challenges the Japanese Policymakers Face
Japan, as the only country in the history that suffered directly from the atomic bomb, has, since the World War 2, carried out a security policy of total rejection of militarist activities, including those born out of the right of belligerency and self defense of the state. The three Non-Nuclear Principles, for instance, prohibits the possession, manufacture, and introduction into Japanese territory of nuclear weapons.This policy is even clearly stated in the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Particularly since the collapse of the Cold War balance of power system, however, the Japanese policymakers are today face to face with new challenges against their national security in the Asia-Pacific region, which lead them to reconsider their security policy.
There are a number of unstable areas in the region including the KoreanPeninsula, the TaiwanStraits, separatist movements in Indonesia, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and this picture depicts a strong potential for any open conflict to go off.[1] Besides these, transnational terrorist organizations such as Aum Shrinkyo threaten the people of Japan very much. Moreover, the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has considerable greatness. Other sources of instability in the Asia Pacific region are piracy and drug trafficking.[2]
The most obvious issue that creates a threat perception in the minds of the Japanese citizens and politicians is the nuclear activities of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It was the first half of the 1990s, when the Japanese people started to recognize the North Korean state as a potential threat to their national security as Korea revealed nuclear and missile development programs. Following this, in August 1998, Kim Jong-il let Taepodong 1 launched, which would create a huge shock and uneasiness in the Japanese islands.[3]
It was not only North Korea that tested their WMDs in 1998. India and Pakistan had also carried out nuclear testes before the Koreans.[4]
In July 2006, the Koreans carried out a series of missile tests, in which Taepodong 2 was launched. Although the missiles were not successful in reaching the targets they, together with the first nuclear test in October 2006, made serious changes in the political climate of East Asia. It is claimed that the missiles used in the tests are mostly Scud missiles with 2500-3000 km range, and Taepodong 2 intercontinental missile can even hit Alaska.[5] So, now that Kim Jong-il’s Korea, right under Japan’s nose, is a nuclear weapon state.[6] With nonproliferation under threat, regional as well as global security is far from reality.
The only issue with North Korea is not these nuclear developments. Another important problem with its neighbor troubling the Japanese government is the abduction of its citizens. The North Koreans have kidnapped a number of Japanese citizens to use in their country as language teachers for their intelligence agents.[7] The abductee issue has created an emotional reaction in the Japanese public.
Another potential threat for Japan is China. The factors that affect Japan’s relations with China can be put as follows: The first, and probably the most important, is the power shift in East Asia. As China has grown so rapidly in the economical field, the gap between China and Japan is no more large. For the first time in the history, the two nations have the same power at the same time.[8] This leads to a competition for regional leadership. Second, the end of the Cold War indicates also the end of the factor binding the two states in the common purpose of checking Soviet expansionism and threats to the regional security. The international environment has also changed.
Besides, the Chinese have for long been building up their medium-range missiles, a primary target of which is Japan. It continues to modernize its nuclear forces as well as its naval and air forces.[9] They have exported Soviet Su-27s to set up their superiority over the Taiwan Strait, which is very close to the Japanese islands. China also has cyber warfare and anti-satellite capabilities.[10] Putting all these together, the Sino-Japanese relations are now shaped on a suspicion and distrust. This can be regarded as a major potential threat for Tokyo.
Russia, despite its decreased influence in Asia Pacific as it has considerably reduced its armed forces in the region, still remains as a significant actor that has to be taken into account since massive military power, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region.[11]
Consequently, the changing nature of threats pushes the Japanese policymakers to take more effective and multidimensional measurements.
Japan’s Security Objectives
Given the challenges above, the Japanese government has certain objectives. According to the report introduced in October 2004 by ‘The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities’, Japan, in the twenty-first century, should adopt the Integrated Security Strategy, which has two major goals. The first is “to prevent a direct threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does reach Japan, to minimize the damage.” And the second goalis “to reduce the chances of threats arising in various parts of the world with the aim of preventing such threats from reaching Japan or affecting the interests of Japanese expatriates and corporations overseas.”[12] So Japan does not want to face any regional as well as global threats against national security. These threats, as already mentioned in the previous section, include that of North Korea, China etc. and other non-state organizations as well.
Japan would avoid any actions that would lead to a proliferation in the Asia Pacific region. The current prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, paid a visit to China some time ago, where he emphasized on and tried to demonstrate to China and the world community that Japan wanted neither Japan nor DPRK nor China to possess nuclear weapons.[13] The current situation in the Korean peninsula pushes the Japanese authorities not to overturn the regime in North Korea but to step by step change the nature of its political and economic systems.[14] This means that Japan will seek in the future an evolution in North Korea rather than a revolution.
But this will include the total termination or freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, the solution of the abductions issue, preventing China or Russia from having dominant influence over the KoreanPeninsula and the rest of the region, and enhancing the strength of the global nonproliferation regime.[15]
How may Japan behave?
Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has been regarded as an “abnormal” country as it does not possess a seriously powerful army.[16] Despite its technological capabilities to manufacture basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time and its improving satellite launch capabilities[17], Japan has not been “entirely normalized”, at least, up to now. But as the new security environment brings about new challenges -both regional and global- against Japan, its traditional understanding of security policy has been necessarily changing.
The greatest threat perception for the Japanese that pushes them to get out of their shell and to get them normalize is North Korea’s nuclear programs. Each time the Japanese policymaking mechanism has faced with a crisis with North Korea, their national security policy has considerably evolved. For example, when the Taepodong was launched from the Korean peninsula right over the Japanese islands in 1998, Japan decided to initiate a joint missile defense research with the US.[18] And since then, the number of Japanese that thinks their country should not refrain from establishing an effective defense that requires some offensive capability.
There has been a taboo for the Japanese society to even argue for the possibility of a Japan with nukes. But recently this taboo has been lowered in response to North Korea. Then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukada, in his speech in 2002, emphasized on the possibility of reconsidering the Three Non-Nuclear principles, if it gained public support in the Japanese society.[19] He was criticized by the public opinion but he was not forced to resign. Japan’s Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba has tried to press for a rougher policy against Kim Jong-il’s Korea.[20] A Japanese official said, "We thought it was better for us not to declare that we will give up our nuclear option forever and ever.”[21]
Yet, for most of the Japanese policymakers it is not a desirable way to deal with North Korea by going nuclear. The Current Prime minister of Japan Shinzo Abe has many times stated that they would remain the Three Non-Nuclear principles of not possessing, not manufacturing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Japanese territory. Accordingly, some experts in the Japanese decision making mechanism and politicians have thinking to modify the defense posture by building up a more powerful conventional capability, as they don’t want to provoke their neighbors with nukes.[22]
A new discussion has started in the country on the option of developing a denial capability against North Korea’s medium-range missiles by conducting preemptive strikes against the launchers. Ishiba put in 2003 that it would be justifiable for Japan to carry out a preemptive strike when they felt the imminence of an attack coming from the peninsula.[23] These actions taken by the Japanese government demonstrates that Japan prefers to respond to North Korea’s missile defense and possibly other defensive measures rather than nuclear armament.
It would not be wrong to say that the threat perception in the islands gets Tokyo closer to Washington. SDF for almost a decade have been coordinating closely with the US for the development of a plan for logistic support to US military actions in case there is a military emergency in the region, particularly in the peninsula. The Japanese government and SDF have now deeper interest in missile defenses. They are importing the Patriot PAC-III system and new Standard Missiles for the Navy Theater Wide System which is developed by the US.[24] These systems, which will decrease Japan’s vulnerability to missile attacks from the peninsula, are planned to be deployed next year. Once Korea launch a third Taepodong missile, Tokyo will most probably initiate the development of robust missile defense system. Such a “collective defense” constitutes a vital significance for Japan besides “collective security” with the UN or another organization involved in dealing with the country’s security.[25] This collective security, however, may require a revision in the Three Principles on Arms Export, because under the current conditions, Tokyo may relax ban on arms export to the USA, if not all countries. Japan indeed needs its partner in its security affairs.
This is not to say, however, that Japan should and will choose in the future to completely buck-pass its security affairs to the United States[26], as it did until 1970s[27]. The activities of Shinzo Abe, particularly, are carried out in a direction that Japan itself is involved in the defense process. Abe is planning a change in the “Peaceful Constitution” of Japan that will allow Japan to take part in various operations with the objective of providing national security. Preparations, for the first time since the Second World War, for the establishment of Defense Ministry[28] are a very obvious sign of the changing security concept in Japan. The nationalist Prime Minister is also planning to establish an intelligence agency.[29] It seems Asia will have to get used to a more active Japan with Abe.
We are observing some drastic changes in the Self Defense Forces as well. As written in the National Defense Program Guideline[30], SDF will play great role “in response to ballistic missile attacks, response to guerillas and special operations force attacks, response to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and response to large-scale and/or special-type (Nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters.”
The Japanese officials have realized, on the other hand, that Japan needs to develop “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities” The Japanese policymakers are taking into account that the ratio of young people in Japan is declining as the birth rates goes very low and fiscal conditions are going down. They now have to attain greater results with the relatively limited sources.
These changes in the Japanese national security and return to indigenous capabilities are in part due to the generational changes in the Japanese society. The younger generation who did not experience the effects of the war directly has no such memories as atomic bomb, which provided ground for total rejection of militarism. The following generations proud of their country’s economical and technological achievements will not be as timid as their ancestors to play greater role in the international politics. It won’t be surprising to hear a Japanese politician saying “I did it my way.” There are now more military realists taking effective part in the political arena of Japan such as Shinzo Abe, the first Prime Minister born after the 1945.
All in all, given its objectives mentioned in the previous section, Japan has basically three approaches in achieving its objectives. First, Japan needs to continue cooperating with the United States; second, Japan should spend great effort itself; finally, it should cooperate with the international community.
Voices Rising from the Neihgbors
Today many countries in East Asia still keep their distrust towards Japan’s intentions, which has had imperial experiences in the past. The Asians have a chronic fear that the residents of the islands have more willingness to get re-armed than they express. They suspect that Japan’s current military limitations are, in essence, superficial.[31] The more Japan gets armed, the more it attracts suspicions from the neighboring countries. Japan’s policies on the way to increase its offense capabilities, thus, have an immediate effect on the defense policies of the other states in the region, including China and South Korea. Such fears may result in a simultaneous arms race or any kind of instability in Asia Pacific. This would not be in the interest of Tokyo. It will be an essential part of Japan’s national security policy not to make itself a target in the eyes of other countries, be they China or South Korea.
Japan’s activities to bridle North Korea trouble its two neighbors, although the Japanese policymakers have many times expressed their unwillingness to go nuclear and then, consequently, cause a proliferation of the WMDs in Pacific Asia. The Chinese military is upset that Tokyo has tightened its alliance with the Americans and that it has been improving its conventional capabilities since the beginning of 1990s. Probably the most worrying fact for the Chinese is that the Japanese SDF is advancing its missile defense.For Beijing, Japan has a much more effective army than it had in the past. China, according to Michael Green[32], is not worried with the important increase in Tokyo’s military expenditure, but with the the changes in the Japanese management and organization, cooperation with the US, and usage of intelligence and technology.
As I already mentioned before, Japan and China, for the first time in the contemporary history, are in a powerful situation at the same time. But in China, unlike Japan, the civilian control over the military is not very strong. Green puts, “controversies over history allow the PLA to demonize and mobilize against Japan.” Therefore, Japan is walking on the risk line.
The comments of the Japanese policymakers on the North Korean nuclear programs increased the tension in the peninsula, too. According to the news of Nikkei, Japanese daily, the spokesman of South Korea Presidency criticized Tokyo, giving examples from Japan’s aggressive policies in the pre-Second-World-War period. He declared that they had to pay great attention to Japan, since there are signs of tendency to its aggression policy.[33]
In effect, it must be the North Koreans, who started, or are about to start, an arm race on the east of the continent. If Japan is to “normalize,” this happens, to a great extent, as a result of Korea’s aggressive policy. Nevertheless, neither China nor South Korea, in today’s conditions, can attempt to adopt effective policies to stop Kim Jong. It would be wrong to hope that China, the so-called ally of North Korea, will change its policy towards the peninsula, because North Korea is in a position of buffer between the USA-SK and China. If the regime in the north collapses, and the South goes into the North, the US forces, who keeps troops in South Korea, will move right forward until the Chinese border. Moreover, too many people will immigrate to the Chinese territories as refugees, which is not something that would please Beijing at all. North Korea’s dependence to a great extent on China is also another factor for Beijing not to choose to overthrow the regime. On the other hand, the Koreans in the South would not like to see their nationals in the North plunging right into a tragedy.[34] Hence, whether it is good for the world security or not, China and South Korea will work to continue the status quo in the peninsula.
Keeping all these in mind, Japanese policymakers should refrain from any acts and actions that will provoke its neighbors. Still, it would not be completely true to say that Japan is adopting its policies accordingly. For instance, as Michael Green points out, “Issues like Yasukuni can affect security policy choices other countries in the region make. The History between Asian powers –and Yasukuni specifically- allows Chinese hawks to push a more aggressive line toward Japan.”[35] Abe’s speeches, before and after the elections, seem to have affected the policies of the other countries.
Shinzo Abe some time ago paid a visit to China, which set a number of firsts. It was the first official visit at prime ministry level to the People’s Republic of China in the last five years, and it was Abe’s first overseas visit, although he was expected to visit first its ally, the United States of America. Abe is clearly willing to warm up their relations with Beijing. Yet, we still don’t know whether Abe’s attempts will give their fruits or not. If not, Japan may get alone in the anarchic international politics of Asia.
There might be no other options left for Japan but holding onto the US. But, can Japan do this without hitting the thorns?
Japan’s Role in the Alliance: A Painter or only a Maulstick?
The United States, since the 1950s, has been the only ally of, Japan. In many terms the Japanese-American partnership has been indispensable, especially for the Japanese. But has such a long history consolidated Japan’s trust towards the Americans? When discussing Japan’s security policy, one student of international relations has to take into account this very nature of the relationship.
First of all saying that ‘each state, including the USA has its own interests’ is sine qua non of a discussion about the Japanese-American alliance. But this, of course, represents some problems for the Japanese policymakers, who are since accustomed to keep on living under the umbrella of the United States.
To begin with, Tokyo wants the solution of the nuclear and abduction issues simultaneously, while the US officials are focused mainly on the nuclear crises. This behavior of the American side makes the Japanese really anxious that the US may in the future disregard the abduction issue in case Kim Jong-il shows willingness in turning back from its nuclear programs.[36] Michael Green claims that “North Korea is hoping to realize direct talks with the USA by creating an atmosphere of crisis.” Washington might attempt to end the issue without the Japanese policymakers. Supportive of this option is that the US government decided to start trilateral talks with DPRK and China, excluding Japan. Thus the Japanese government maintains its insisting manner on the resolution of the issue in a multilateral framework in which Japan also takes a seat.[37]
However, it is very difficult for Japan to make what it wants done as long as the current distribution of power remains.The US has put effective pressures on the Japanese government when necessary, most of which, if not all, resulted in the compliance or losing prestige of Tokyo. For instance, the events in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks demonstrates the influence of the US pressure as Washington get the Japanese Self Defense Forces involved in the war on terror. And although the public strongly opposed the war in Iraq, the government of Japan avoided risking the relations with Washington as it remained utmost importance in the solution of the Korean issue.[38] Hence Japan will have to take into account the US interests when establishing its security policy.
What is more complicating the issue is that although, in 2003, officials in Washington stated that an attack against Japan coming from the Korean peninsula would be regarded as an attack against the United States of America, the Americans may even chose not to retaliate against Kim Jong-il. This is because such retaliation may incite the Koreans and cause greater stability in the peninsula and its surrounding. North Korea may well attack the South in case the US troops goes on a war with her.[39] This would bring much greater stability to East Asia, which is not in the interests of any country in the region as well that of the US.
Besides, another fact that awakens questions in the minds the Japanese policymakers is that their American friends, particularly with the end of the Cold War, extended their influence areas into other parts of the world, and this has led the them to withdraw asignificant size of their troops from South Asia.[40] This might drive Japan to take more responsibilities in the alliance, and this would mean that Japan will have to spend more efforts and money on its security, becoming gradually distant from its ally. Japan today faces the dilemma of entrapment vs. abandonment in the alliance.
But the US also faces a dilemma, although it does not constitute uneasiness in Washington as Japan’s. That is if the USA continues to transfer defense technology to Japan, this will feed competitive indigenous Japanese capabilities; but is it restricts its transfer, indigenous alternative to US equipment will gain political support in Tokyo.[41] So it is not only the United States who has the cards in the table given the ability of the Samurais to convert their mental capabilities to economical and technological capabilities. This is not a totally unilateral game at all. But, I believe, turning the relationship into a Bush vs. Bushi rivalry is not the objective of the two states since it would not be in the interest of either side.
Conclusion
The security issue is indeed very complicating for Japan. The deadlocks in the current security environment, such as the unending actions of North Korea and the -maybe exaggerated- threat perceptions of its neighbors so on, might hug tie the Japanese policymakers in decision-making processes. The generations are changing, and the newcomers may alter the current atmosphere surrounding Japan. Will Japan throw away the threat of North Korea; bring an end to the potential stability in Pacific Asia, and solve other problems discomforting them? We don’t know the answer. We can only predict that we will witness a more active Japan in the international arena, as a result of the impulsing facts.
Mendl, Wolf. Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests.London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
Articles
Lind, Jennifer M. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” International Security. 29.1 (2004): 92-121.
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Kamiye, Matake. “A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea.” May 2003. Arms Control Association. 16 Oct. 2006 .
“National Defense Program Guideline.” 2004. Japanese Defense Agency. 16 Oct. 2006.
Toki, Masako. “Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan’s Role in the NPT.” Dec. 2005. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 16 Oct. 2006 .
“The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report: Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities.” Oct. 2004. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities. 16 Oct. 2006.
Yamaji, Hideki. “Future Japanese Security Policies: Contending Approaches.” Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2004. The Brookings Institution. 16 Oct. 2006 .
Pehlivantürk, Bahadır. “ABD ve Çin’in Kuzey Kore Çıkmazı.” 31 Oct. 2006. ASAM. 12 Nov. 2006.
Jing-dong, Yuan. “Japan-China Relations in a New Era.” Taipei Times. 11 Oct. 2006. 12 Nov. 2006.
Toki, Masako, and Mary Beth Nikitin. “Opportunity for Japan Over North Korea.” Asia Times 2 Nov. 2006. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 12 Nov. 2006.
“Seven Questions: Reshaping Japan’s Security.” Foreign Policy August 2006. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 21 Oct. 2006.
Lieggi, Stephanie, and Mark Wuebbels. “Will Emerging Challenges Change Japanese Security Policy?” Dec. 2003. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 16 Oct. 2006.
[32] Michael Green served as special assistant to President George W. Bush for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council from January 2004 to December 2005.
[33] Pehlivantürk, Bahadır. Kuzey Kore Japonya’yı Silahlanmaya İtiyor.
[35]Before his election as Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni, a shrine that includes convicted war criminals in its honored war dead. This visit increased the tension between Japan and China.
Kişisel sayfama hoşgeldiniz. Burada benim ders notlarım ve projelerimin yanı sıra tarihi ve güncel konu ve olaylarla ilgili yapmış olduğum araştırmaları bulabilirsiniz. Sayfamda siyasetten sanata, spordan günlük yaşama kadar farklı konularda naçizane bilgi ve görüşlerimi sizlerle paylaşacağım.
"Herkes benim düşünceme katılırsa yanılmış olmaktan korkarım." Oscar Wilde
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