Cyprus Conflict

By Kıvanç Sağır, Mehmet Ali Sezal & Christa de Visser

Conflict Studies Webpage

Introduction

The conflict on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus is one of the long-lasting and currently unresolved ethnic conflicts in the international community at this time. It has been devastating for both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in terms of lives, orphaned children, economical loss and psychological destruction. The conflict began in the 1950s, erupted violently with bloodshed at the end of 1963, and culminated in 1974 with the interventions of Greece and later Turkey that led to the island’s current division between the Greek south and the Turkish north. In more recent years both the UN and the EU have concerned themselves with the conflict, but thus far the island remains divided and a solution seemingly unreachable.

Table of Contents:

1. Timeline of the conflict
2. Political Background of the conflict
3. Different points of view
4. Cyprus and the External parties
5. Context of the current conflict
6. Core conflict issues
7. Causes of conflict Immediate triggers/katalysts (1974 & 1963)
8. Causes of conflict Proximate Causes
9. Causes of conflict Fundamental and long-term causes
10. Conflict Resolution

Political background of the conflict

Like with many conflicts, it is hard to determine when exactly the Cyprus conflict began. Some argue the conflict had its origins way back in history, and the extensive history of the island is indeed eventful since many powers have tried to govern the island, and many succeeded for some period or another (i.e. the English, Venetians, Ottomans). But looking at more recent history, it is clear that the last hundred years have been decisive in the development of the recent conflict.

Cyprus, an island south of Turkey, is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, and has been the object of discussion for many decades. The recent conflict that has arisen over the question which country can govern the island has led to a division of Cyprus into four areas or zones, as can been seen below. This is obviously a testimony of the complexity of the conflict, for four parties are involved, with each a very distinct position in the island’s history. The main players in the conflict are Greece and Turkey, even though interference by the United Kingdom (UK), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) has added to the recent complex situation.

Map of Cyprus

In 1878 Cyprus was placed under British control following the Cyprus Convention. This Convention came into being after secret negotiations between the British and the Ottomans, concluding that the British would be allowed to govern Cyprus in exchange for support in the Russian-Turkish war. In the years before the First World War the British formally annexed the island as a reaction to the Turkish participation in the Central Powers, which opposed the Allies that the British were part of. The British were clear about their intent to unite Cyprus with Greece after the First World War, but that intention, even though often repeated (during the Second World War too) was never put into action. Even though the inhabitants of Cyprus tried through referenda and demonstrations to assure a union with Greece, the British were eager to keep their position on the island, thereby provoking the start of a Greek-Cypriot guerrilla struggle by a militant group who called themselves the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA), which is Greek for 'National Organisation of Cypriotic Warriors'. As a counterpart to the EOKA Turkish-Cypriot militants formed the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT-movement) in 1958, which translates as 'Turkish Resistance Organisation'. These groups obviously had different objectives. The EOKA was in favour of enosis, which, as the Greek word for ‘union’, refers to the union of Cyprus with Greece. The TMT was in favour of taksim, which is the Turkish word for ‘partition’, and refers to the partitioning of Cyprus into a Greek and a Turkish part. Two years later in 1960 a constitution was agreed upon. This constitution led to the institution of a presidential system of government, designed to give both the Turkish and the Greek a representation to protect their interests. Following internal struggles in Greece the Greek colonels decided to support a coup in Nicosia (Cyprus' capital) in 1974. Turkey was quick to follow with a militairy operation, 'the Cyprus Peace Operation', whereby they ocuppied the north of the island, as can be seen on the map above. Because many inhabitants of the island left their homes following these two operations, the Turks brought people in from Turkey to influence the ethnic make up of the area, which by the 1949 Geneva convention is a crime. The Turkish declared an independant state, called it the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', and held their first elections in 1985.

Wikipedia Cyprus 22 april 2007 Wikipedia Northern Cyprus 22 april 2007 Eric Solsten, ed. Cyprus: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. At: Countrystudies 21 april 2007

Different points of view

The Cyprus conflict is viewed very differently by Turkish and Greek sides. While Greeks mark the 1974 military intervention of Turkey as the source of conflict, Turks believe that the real conflict started in 1963 with the Akritas Plan of Greek-Cypriots. As in most conflicts both parties view the other as the evil party; the one creating the conflict. Currently the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is presidented by Mehmet Ali Talat, and Turkey is presidented by Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The Greek president of the Republic of Cyprus is Tassos Nikolaou Papadopoulos, and the president of Greece is currently Karolos Papoulias. All play more or less a role in the current conflict, as did preciding leaders, which we will touch upon later. The conflict seems to be, however, mainly a business of state, since Cyprian refugees coming from both sides are often found living right next to each other in their new place of residence without any problems occuring. Many negotiations led to the conclusion that Cyprus should become a federation, but there was always some issue preventing the federation being formed. At the moment the conflict seems to be in a de-escalatory state, especially because of the EU's demand that the Cyprus issue be solved before Turkey can join the EU. Internationally there is a strong pressure on Turkey and Greece to solve the issue, but whether this will actually lead to a solution remains yet to be seen.

Map of the area

Turkish Perspective

With the 1960 constitutional agreement the Republic of Cyprus was founded and everything seemed satisfactory for a while. However after some time President Makarios started to believe that the constitution gave more rights to Turkish-Cypriots than they really deserved. Thus, in 30th November 1963, 13 provisions of constitutional change package, which diminished the Turkish rights and even abolished the veto power of Vice-president Dr. Küçük, was submitted but vetoed immediately by the Turkish side. After that, in 21st December 1963, the Greek-side initiated the Akritas Plan which was basically aiming at an ethnic cleansing of Turkish-Cypriots. 30000 Turks were forced to leave their villages and the whole Turkish population fled to 3% of the whole Cyprus land. Civilian Turkish population, people without any means of arms, women, children were slain brutally. Greeks cut all the means of communication and transportation. Furthermore they put heavy economic constraints and isolated the Turkish population from the rest of the world. After that in 1964 UN intervened and sent a peacekeeping force. However, the administration of the island was then left only to the Greek side. In 1967, with the military coup in Greece the enosis-ideal become once again public. EOKA’s attacks against Turkish citizens increased, Turkish people were slain again and the others had to run away, and in 1974 a coup was made against Makarios by radical EOKA.

Following this Turkey asked the UK for a joint military intervention but the UK chose to remain not involved and thus Turkey, depending on 1960 Guarantor Agreement intervened in Cyprus: the Cyprus Peace Operation. In 1975 a population exchange occurred and finally two homogenous population were established: Greeks in the South, Turks in the North. Today the closed Maraş (Varosa) district in Gazi Magosa (Famagusta) is still kept and no one is allowed to enter. Evidence of the massacre that Greeks were guilty of is still there and thus kept alive by the Turkish Army as the legal basis of the intervention. Continuous debates on unification remained fruitless and the Greeks even wanted to expand their authority to the North. Because of uncooperative behavior and unacceptable terms of Greeks, finally the Turkish side, calling upon their right of self-determination, declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. However this state was not recognized internationally except by Turkey. And Republic of Cyprus (referred to as Greek Cypriot Administration in Southern Cyprus by Turkey and TRNC) was officially recognized as the only legal authority in the island. Since then again a great number of attempts were made to reach a resolution, they remained fruitless. The final solution plan put forward by Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general of the time, was questioned in referenda in both sides of Cyprus in 2004. While the Turkish side agreed to the plan, the answer from the Greek side was no. This ironic result of the referenda showed that it was Greeks who did not want a solution not Turks. And unfortunately resolution of Cyprus conflict is put forward as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession to the EU, while there was not such a requirement for Southern Cyprus’ membership.

An EOKA victim

All in all Turkey took a few positions in the negotiations that have prevented a solution. They differ with Greece on two important issues, which Turkey considers vital for a possible agreement. First of all, Turkey always favoured a weak central government presiding over two sovereign states in voluntary association (a legacy of earlier fears of domination by the majority of Greek-Cypriots). Whereas Greece favours a strong central government. Secondly, Turkey opposed all plans for demilitarisation because of their security concerns.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Public Information Office 6 April 2007

Greek Prespective

In 1974 Turkey, a member of the UN, invaded another member of the UN, the Republic of Cyprus. First only 3% of the island was invaded but the Turkish army expanded the invasion gradually during the course of meetings in an attempt to solve the problem. It is also a case of constant, flagrant and mass violation of basic human rights and freedoms by Turkey and a violation of the goals and principles of the UN Charter as well as of the most important international agreements in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. There are currently 40000 Turkish troops on the island, totally illegally. Although there have been numerous condemnations of Turkish invasion in international arena, including the UN, Turkish troops are still settled on the island. What is important to note is that in the time of invasion Turkish population constituted only 18% of the whole population and the total area Turkey invaded was 36%. Besides the vast material and economic catastrophe, the invasion and occupation forced 28% of the Greek-Cypriots to become refugees. Some 1,493 people are still missing and, despite various judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Turkish side has not provided the data required to ascertain the fate of the missing.

The ongoing and systematic destruction by Turkey of Cypriot cultural heritage in the occupied area of Cyprus is part of a pre-planned policy aimed at eradicating and destroying all trace of the 9,000 years of Cypriot history and civilization, and at transforming occupied Cyprus into just another Turkish province, through a systematic process of 'Turkification'. Important archaeological sites in the occupied area of Cyprus have, since 1974, been completely abandoned and left open to the constant risk of looting and destruction. There are 275 churches in occupied Cyprus, 75 have been converted into mosques, 141 have been desecrated, 13 have been converted into storage spaces or stockyards, 3 into icon museums, and 4 for propaganda purposes into cultural centres, whilst a further 20 are used by the occupying regime as military depots, barracks, restaurants and military hospitals. Churches throughout occupied Cyprus have been stripped of their contents and converted into mosques (as in the case of the church of Andreas the Apostle in Neapolis), hospitals, night clubs, livestock pens, warehouses and stables. Icons, murals, hagiographic paintings, and precious and unique mosaics have been looted or destroyed. The church of Agia Anastasia in occupied Lapithos, built in the late 19th century, converted into a hotel and Casino. It is estimated that about 160,000 settlers from Turkey have been illegally established in the occupied section of Cyprus since 1974, and are encroaching on the property of the ousted Greek-Cypriots. Other sources put the number of settlers at about 110,000. These settlers were given citizenship and the right to vote, in an attempt to undermine the position of the Turkish-Cypriot community, so that it might lend its support to the occupation regime. At the same time, the number of native Turkish-Cypriots who have been forced to migrate due to the unfavourable conditions prevailing in the northern section of Cyprus is increasing steadily. Of the approximately 120,000 native Turkish-Cypriot residents in 1974, today there are fewer than 90,000. With a further 40,000 Turkish soldiers stationed permanently on the island, the ratio of Turks to Turkish-Cypriots in occupied Cyprus is about 2 to 1. This is a tragic irony, as the invasion and on-going occupation of the northern part of the island was carried out under the pretext of protecting the Turkish-Cypriots.

TMT victims, still missing

All in all we can say that on the part of Greece, a few factors have stood in the way of the solution of the conflict. First of all Greece took a strong line on the right of return for all refugees to properties vacated in the 1974 displacement of Cypriots. Secondly, Greece was not in favour of all proposals which did not allow for the repatriation of Turkish settlers from the mainland who had emigrated to Cyprus since 1974 (thereby reinstating the original ethnic devision), Thirdly, Greece supported a stronger central government than Turkey did.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office 6 April 2007

Context of the current conflict

One of the reasons that the current conflict on the island of Cyprus is so complex is because it has a broad context, with many parties involved in one way or another. Therefore we will now look at the different levels of context (state level, regional level, global level) and see how they have influenced the conflict and the fact that no solution has been found yet.

Context at the state level is an important part of the analysis of the Cyprus-conflict, especially from the Turkish perspective. The main conflict of Greek-Cypriots versus Turkish-Cypriots in terms of administration and later on violent actions gives an insight into how the conflict came into being within the state. Unfortunately there seems no state apparatus that can solve the conflict since the conflict is now far more layered than a simple domestic conflict and even the state formation in Cyprus can now be considered as one of the causes of the conflict.

Apart from the state level the Cyprus conflict gained a regional significance. EOKA's attempts to unite the island with Greece and later on Turkey's military intervention in 1974 changed the whole regional picture. After the declaration of the TRNC Turkey became very much like a parent state for the TRNC and gave full support. Greece, on the other hand, also gave support to the Republic of Cyprus / Greek Cypriot Administration. Furthermore this conflict also caused weakening and stressing in the relations between Greece and Turkey.

The United Kingdom's involvement can be analysed in both regional and global contexts. Cyprus was a dependent part of the UK before 1960. All the constitutional agreements and the declaration of independence were made together by the UK (as a guarantor), Greece and Turkey. Although the UK did not want a joint intervention in 1974, it was not totally against Turkish intervention too. However, after the intervention, as the circumstances changed, the UK adopted a policy in which it openly turned against such an intervention.

South Cyprus' candidacy, and later on membership, of the European Union gave a new dimension to the conflict. Turkey was in a position where it did not recognize a EU member and furthermore it was occupying a EU member's territory. Apart from that, the resolution of the conflict is put as a prerequisite for Turkey's membership to the EU.

In global context reflections on a conflict taking place on such a small island was unexpectedly high. The United States of America (USA) was involved in the conflict from the 1960s. President Johnson himself wrote a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in 1964 in which he basically warned İnönü not to intervene. Since then the USA keep concerning themselves with the issue. It is a widespread thought in Europe that the USA is concerned and wants to resolve the conflict because Turkey is an ally of the USA and with Turkey as a member of the EU the USA will have a second close ally in the EU, together with the United Kingdom.

The United Nations sent a peacekeeping force before the intervention but it did not restore peace. There had been several resolutions that passed in the UN concerning the Cyprus conflict but they were only condemnations and advisory opinions. UN's attempts to solve the conflict remained unsatisfactory and even Kofi Annan's plan for resolution was not accepted (because of the Greek votes). So today the UN and the EU try to solve the conflict in different ways, however, these two organizations' attitudes are also conflicting between themselves and thus a real solution seems to remain at a distance.

Cyprus and the external parties

In regarding the Cyprus conflict it is impossible to ignore the role of external parties like the UK, UN, and, more recently, the EU. In the involvement of these three external parties it is clear that a few core issues re-defined the conflict. The Cyprus conflict was never just between Greece and Turkey, but the other parties and their respective demands and interests have formed the conflict in an undeniable way. Here we will give a short overview of these other parties and their histories in the Cyprus conflict, thereby we hope to make clear how the core issues of the conflict have evolved over time and how they have been influenced by these external actors.

Different signs in the four areas of Cyprus

Cyprus and the United Kingdom

As mentioned above, Cyprus was placed under British rule in 1878 following the Cyprus convention by which: "His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England." The Sultan (of the Ottoman Empire) gave the island to the British to prevent Russia from expanding its reign in the areas belonging to the weakening Ottoman Empire. For the Sultan, it therefore seemed to be mainly a matter of self-defence to give Cyprus to the British, who quickly established a colonial administration on the island. There was, however, an agreement that the British would have to pay an annual fixed payment to the Sultan, which was often referred to as the Cyprus lease, or Cyprus Tribute. This implies that the Sultan saw the agreement as temporary, which also explains why Turkey still believes they are the rightful owner of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots, however, made it clear for the start that they wanted enosis with the Greek mainland, and the British were immediately faced with that Greek Cypriot nationalism. The annual payment was paid by the Cypriots to the British, who were supposed to transfer the amount to the Sultan, but they never did. It was deposited in the Bank of England to pay off Turkish Crimean War loans on which Turkey had defaulted. This arrangement greatly disturbed the Turks as well as the Cypriots, for now the Cypriots were paying a debt that they had absolutely no connection to, and it quickly became a symbol of British oppression, and remained that way for a long time. When Turkey joined Germany and its allies in 1914 Britain annulled the 1878 Convention and annexed the island of Cyprus. The British then offered the island to Greece in exchange for support in the war, but Greece declined. In the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne Turkey was compensated for the loss of the island. In the years that followed Britain ruled the island with harsh measures, particularly after the riots in 1931.

After both Greece and Turkey had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the 1950s, settlement of the Cyprus issue became more important to the Western powers. However, other than the diplomatic course and the idea to get the UN involved, there were not many plans on how to achieve a settlement. When the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 and Cyprus became a member of the UN, England's role on the island was more or less finished. This was after a prolonged period during which England didn't seem to concern itself much with the island. However, England still maintains a few military bases on the island.

Eric Solsten, ed. Cyprus: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. At: Countrystudies 21 april 2007 Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis By Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon The National Interest, Winter 2001-2002

Cyprus and the United Nations

The Republic of Cyprus applied for, and was granted UN membership in 1960. In 1964, after a short period of bloodshed and harsh measures to prevent that, the UN recommended the creation of a UN peacekeeping force, which the Republic of Cyprus consented to. After the 1974 Turkish Invasion the UN was concerned with the continuing bloodshed and violence and demanded that the Turks would leave the island, which they did not. After soldiers of the peacekeeping forces were killed the UN began to search for a peaceful settlement through negotiations. It was unilaterally decided that Turkey would occupy 37% of the island and the Republic of Cyprus could keep the rest, which was condemned by the UN. In the years that followed the UN did not much to find a solution for the remaining conflict. It decided to keep the troops on the island, usually because the Republic of Cyprus requested that. It is important to note that the UN still does not acknowledge the northern -Turkish- part of the island, and in UN decisionmaking the Turkish side is never involved. Over time this has led to the idea that the United Nations are on the Greek side. However, in 1979 the UN strongly welcomed 'the ten-point agreement for resumption of the intercommunal talks'. The four basic guidelines for the following meetings were:

• Cyprus would be an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic.
• The territory under the administration of each community was to be discussed in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights.
• Questions of principle such as freedom of movement and settlement, rights of ownership, and certain special matters were to be open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental decision for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties.
• The powers and functions of a central government would be such as to safeguard the unity of the country.

The UN played the role of a mediator in the following years and supported many negotiations and plans, including the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus, which was a detailed plan concerning the institution of a federal government. Until now, these plans and negotiations have not led to a resolution. In the part on 'core issues' we will come back to the negotiations.

UN resolution UN resolution 22 april 2007 Eric Solsten, ed. Cyprus: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. At: Countrystudies 22 april 2007 Wikipedia UN resolutions 22 april 2007 Cyprus chronology 22 april 2007 Alan James: The UN force in Cyprus. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 481-500 INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

Cyprus and the European Union

Cyprus became an associate member of the European Commission (EC) in June 1973, motivated largely by a desire to maintain its major trading partnership with Britain. The EC was not very eager to get involved in political disputes and therefore kept a distance regarding the Cyprus conflict. The republic of Cyprus was focused on Europe and applied for full membership of the EC in 1990. For the leader of the Republic of Cyprus this application was a formal move, since it was not expected that accession would be possible before the end of the century. It was hoped that the EC accession timetable would parallel a negotiation timetable, so that a new federal government and full membership in the EC could be achieved at the same time. The leader of the Republic of Cyprus argued that the benefits of EC membership would be conferred on "all Cypriots without exception." And apart from that, should negotiations fail, the EC was a welcome new partner. Negotiations have not yet led to the institution of a federal government. In 2004 the whole of Cyprus did become a member of the EU (formerly the EC), although legislation only applies to the Republic of Cyprus.

In 1987 Turkey applied for membership of the EU. The EU's opinion that the situation in Cyprus, among other things, did not create a favourable environment to begin negotiations. In 1997, when the negotiations with other states including Cyprus began, the same was, according to the EU, still true for Turkey, and negotiations were delayed. In an attempt to begin negotiations and to enter a reunified Cyprus into the EU, Turkey supported the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus. This plan was, as noted above, rejected by Greece. Greece did, however, as the first member-state, support Turkish membership of the EU. In 2005 the EU started negotiations with Turkey, but the Cyprus-issue remains one of the mayor obstacles for membership, because Turkey refuses to acknowledge the Republic of Cyprus until after accession to the EU. This issue alone is of great diplomatic concern because it paradoxically implies that Turkey does not fully recognize the side it is negotiating with, because it denies the existence of one of the EU members.

All in all the Cyprus conflict has led to diplomatic complexity in the EU. Turkey badly wants to join the EU but Cyprus is one of the things that remains in the way of that. Because of ongoing negotiations attempting to grant Turkey membership of the EU, the Cyprus issue is ever more urgent. It is hard to determine what this dispute will lead to, for it is highly unlikely, given the respective history of Turkey and Cyprus, that Turkey will revise its position and suddenly acknowledge the Republic of Cyprus. The EU could revise its negotiation-rules concerning Turkey or not, and thereby further delay negotiations. Whichever way, it is unlikely that any of these scenarios will lead to a solution of the conflict, more seems to be needed for that.

Eric Solsten, ed. Cyprus: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. At: Countrystudies 22 april 2007 Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis. By Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon. The National Interest, Winter 2001-2002 EU and the Cyprus Problem. By Neill Nugent. Journal of Common Market Studies, March 2000. Vol. 38, No. 1 pp 131-150. Wikipedia Turkish accession

Core conflict issues

It is very unfortunate that there are only very few points on which Greek and Turkish sides agree that there is a conflict. This results in most of the negotiations being a discussion on history, instead of a step into the future. When both disagree on the point that should be discussed, discussing them is impossible. The two points both sides do agree on are:

• One point is the coup d'etat made by EOKA. However, Greece claims that it would have been dealt with easily without the Turkish intervention.
• The second point is the situation of island after the 1974 military intervention of Turkey. Although claims on boths sides are fairly different, they both agree that there was and is a conflict still going on after that incident.

The rest of the arguments are different and both sides are actually ignoring the other one's claims and thus there is no real progress in even determining what the conflict is about. Both parties disagree on who did what, who should have done what and who must do what in the future.

The most apparent (non-violent) conflict points have been those that are related to the role of the Turkish army in the island, the status of the Turkish northern part, and that of the Greek southern part.

Also in several meetings between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, the refugee problem was one of the core issues of discussion. Especially after the Turkish intervention in 1974 a large population of Greek Cypriots residing in the north had to leave their house and move to the south. Greek Cypriots, through their official positions and public political culture, have claimed the right of the refugees to go back to their homes. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, interpret such attempts by the Greek Cypriots as ones whose aim is to take back everything for themselves and totally uproot them, leaving them helpless and unprotected.

Key actors at inter-communal and/or intrastate level

Greek Cypriots

From the perspective of Greek Cypriots, they constitute an overwhelming majority in the island; and thus Cyprus is a Greek island. Although they shelved the idea of enosis and its linkage to their population’s dominance years ago, their majority has not lost its crucial role in their rejection to have equal status with the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek part of the island believes and are pleased that the international community accepts them as the only legitimate representative of Cyprus as a whole. Accordingly, it is necessary to resolve the problem in such a way that will bring an end to the division on the island, which is the result of the Turkish invasion of 1974. They are willing to establish a strong central authority over the affairs relating to the whole island of Cyprus, and the decision-making process in this state will be, as they desire, in the hands of the representatives of the majority of the island, the Greek Cypriots.

Turkish Cypriots

The Turkish side of the island holds the view that two entirely equal communities exist on the island, whose environment is actually a threat to the existence of it, as the larger group in the island, Greek Cypriots, has continuingly had claims for power. Therefore, the most appropriate solution is the establishment of two equal and separate states with common legal framework of a federation. Any formation that hinders the Turkish Cypriots’ right of veto is unacceptable. In affect, Turkish Cypriots are slightly satisfied with the current division in the island. Though, they have to tackle their relatively poor economic conditions compared to those of the Greek side, which pushes them to demand changes in the present situation. Especially the international embargo on the northern part and the still existing macro-economic problems in Turkey, the ‘vital’ partner, are those obstacles that the Turkish Cypriots want to eliminate. Another point that they want to address has been their concerns related to Cyprus’ membership of the EU. As said by the Turkish Cypriots, the accession of the island to the EU was realized without their approval in a separate ballot. Their membership in such a way means the violations of the past international agreements; and it is seen, by some, as an effective de facto union with Greece.

International (interstate) and/or regional level of the Cyprus conflict

In this part, we shall examine the internationalization of the conflict. Actually it was the Greek side of the island and their partners in the mainland of Greece that, directly and indirectly, led to the internationalization of the issue. From 1950 onwards, for instance, Makarios worked systematically to get the Greek government directly involved in the enosis-campaign, and to take the Cyprus question to the United Nations. The Greeks were indeed very successful –as seen below- in drawing the attention of the world community through, especially, their lobbying activities. Even, to that effect, they gained international recognition as the Republic of Cyprus, simultaneously leading to the injection of economic embargo and cultural and political restrictions on the northern side of the island. So much provoked by the commotion of the enosists, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and his colleagues established the Turkish Cypriot Popular Party, where the Turkish Cypriot nationalism found its formation and expression. It was not until the Turkish Cypriots decided to send a dramatic complaint telegram to the President and Prime Minister of Turkey in 1948 that they truly won the support of the ‘motherland’ against their ‘enemy’ on the island. This telegram had a great impact upon the press and youth in Turkey, who began taking increasing interest in the affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community. The two different communities with opposing nationalistic values and ideals then confronted the bloody events occurred in their ‘same homeland’ from 1955 onwards. As a result, while in the first scene it had been just a non-violent conflict at an inter-communal level, which was between Greek Cypriot enosists and Turkish Cypriot anti-enosists, the issue later became an arena of ‘open dispute’ between Greece and Turkey in the international level, and still continued at the inter-communal level (and, later, intra-state) inside the island, this time, with violence.

Greece

Most of the Greeks share the belief with the Greek Cypriots that Cyprus is a Greek island. This is not to say, however, that the idea of enosis is still on the agenda. The Cyprus issue constitutes a major obstacle in front of the bilateral relations with Turkey. Athens explicitly, and successfully, uses it as an instrument in its relations with Ankara. Turkey is still perceived as the primary threat to their homeland. This is mostly due to the “power imbalance” that weighs more in the Turkish side of the scales; and it is essential for the security of Greece to internationalize the Cyprus issue. Even the Greeks have accomplished to make it sort of nuisance to their neighbor in their relations with and accession process to the European Union.

Turkey

The Turkish government has a number of interests on the island. First of all, its geographical distance to Cyprus gives Turkey utmost importance in geopolitical terms. The closest point of the island is only 40 miles away from the southern coast of Turkey, which is indeed very close compared to the 500 miles of distance to Greece. In 1954, the Turkish representative expressed in the General Assembly Turkey’s interest in the island as follows: “Turkey is primarily concerned with the status of this island because of racial, historical, and contractual reasons… Cyprus is important for the defense of southern Turkey and of the northern Mediterranean in general.” They have a security interest in maintaining the strong position it acquired with the 1974 intervention. This area has gained more significance in the eyes of the Turks with the initiation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline carrying oil from Caspian region to Ceyhan. The security of the island is also crucial for general security of the Levant.

According to Ankara, Cyprus contains two ethnic groups, each belonging to a different nation. It is an indispensable fact that these two groups have to work together, which is definitely to their mutual benefit. In the same line with the view of the Turkish Cypriots, it does not constitute an essential point that the Turks are in number less than the Greeks on the island. The bi-national composition of Cyprus is essential. Turkish Cypriots cannot accept being a Cypriot ‘minority’ if Greek Cypriots regard themselves as just Greeks, not as a Cypriot majority. There should be two-self determinations, not one. These two self-determinations should be realized in the form of either territorial partition, or a unified state with which executive and legislative power is shared between the two communities, and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots are guaranteed on an equal basis. Turkey, who sees itself as a guarantor of Cyprus, strongly opposed to Cyprus’ unilateral accession to the EU, as, for Ankara, it could be only permissible if both countries were admitted simultaneously.

Regional polity level

EU: The EU has, as mentioned before, long pursued a policy of non-involvement in the Cyprus problem. Since Greece’s admission to the EU in 1981 and the establishment of the customs union with Cyprus in 1987, however, it has become indeed difficult for the EU to maintain this policy. And the nomination of an EU observer to the talks between the communities that took place under UN auspices in 1993 was the first sign of greater EU involvement.

Global level

USA:The Greek lobby in the US is conscious about how to hamper Washington’s relations with Ankara by using the Cyprus factor in, for instance, preventing the delivery of contracted arms sales to Turkey. The US has been one of the key actors in the initiation of economical and political embargo on the Turkish Cypriot society.

main resources: Anastasiou, Harry. “Communication Across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus.” Journal of Peace Research. 39.5 (2002): 581-596. Fisher, Ronald J. “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse.” Journal of Peace Research. 38.3 (2001): 307-326. Kramer, Heinz. “The Cyprus Problem and European Security.” Survival. 39.3 (1997): 16-31. Stavrinides, Zenon. The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood. Nicosia: CYREP, 1999.

Causes of conflict

So what exactely caused the conflict? There are many ways of answering that question. A conflict has many levels of causes, beginning at the immediate triggers (the small occurences that set of the conflict that was slumbering), moving on to the proximate causes (the specific situational circumstances) and the original causes (underlying issues), in order to make a thorough analysis of the different things that caused the Cyprus conflict. What actually happened before the conflict became as it is now?

Immediate triggers/katalysts

In the case of the Cyprus conflict it is hard to determine triggers or catalysts. As a long conflict which is still dragging on it does not seem to have a few immediate factors which caused the conflict to begin: there are too many to name. The Cyprus conflict has gone through many phases and each phase has its own triggers and catalysts which made the conflict blaze up again. To be able to start at the beginning we would have to go a long way back, and as stated before, it is almost impossible to determine when the conflict started, thus it is almost impossible to determine what triggered the conflict in the first place. But it would be unnecessary to do so: we can look at some key-moments in the conflict and determine what triggered them, in order to analyze the conflict as a whole. Thereby it is important to mark that many events, triggered by other events, also function as triggers themselves, as we shall see in the following analysis. Once again, different parties will have different ways of looking at the triggers and catalysts of the key-moments in the conflict; if possible I will try to do justice to both points of view.

1974 Nicosia Coup and Cyprus Peace Operation

1974 was a turbulent year on the island of Cyprus. The elected president of Cyprus, Makarios, had already been the target of attacks and attempted assassinations before, but in April 1974 Greece made a serious attempt to remove Makarios by supporting a junta-coup in Nicosia. Turkey followed with the Cyprus Peace Operation. All this led to the still ongoing division of Cyprus in two parts. To be able to understand what triggered the Coup in Nicosia and the following Cyprus Peace Operation we have to look at events that took place just before that. It was widely acknowledged before the Coup that, if such a Coup were to take place, Turkey would follow with an intervention. Even the American president at that time, Kissinger, was aware of this, he even stated: “I had always taken it for granted that the next intercommunal crisis in Cyprus would provoke Turkish intervention.” At that time in history the dictatorship in Greece was not in the least satisfied with Makarios’ rule. Greece supported rightwing gangster organisations on the island and had plans to annex at least part of the island, allegedly for strategic reasons. The same was true for Turkey. But Makarios, being a democratically elected leader of Cyprus and a charismatic leader, would not allow such an annexation. In addition the Greek junta had proposed in vain to him a plan to eliminate the Turkish Cypriots. For these reasons, the Greek dictator Papadopoulos wanted Makarios removed, reasoning that Makarios was the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions, a stance that US president Kissinger copied.

Nicosia in flames after the 1974 Coup

The US was heavily involved in the dictatorship in Greece, not just because of the CIA-ties between the two, and even though the US was aware of the planned coup, Kissinger decided not to intervene, in defiance of the advice given to him by his staff. On July 1 1974, three senior officials of the Greek foreign ministry, all known for their moderate views on the Cyprus question, publicly tendered their resignations. On July 3, President Makarios made public an open letter to the Greek junta, which made the direct accusation of foreign interference and subversion. He called for the withdrawal from Cyprus of the officers responsible. Greek militants and officers were put on stand-by, awaiting a good and seemingly spontaneous opportunity to attempt murdering Makarios. A week and a half later on April 15th, the planned Coup took place. The coup was only half successful: the EOKA took over power, but Makarios fled and it took the Turks only six days to counterattack. It is plain that the coup in Nicosia triggered the perhaps inevitable invasion of the Turks. The events left 200,000 refugees unable to return to their homes and 6,000 Greek Cypriots and 900 Turkish Cypriots dead or missing. It is clear from this case that the events themselves can easily function as triggers, complicating thereby the clear distinction between triggers and events.

Lobby for Cyprus Cyprus-conflict.net Peace-Cyprus.org BBC News all accessed 19 May 2007

1963 Constitutional breakdown

When we go back in history it is however apparent that some events in Cyprus history have very clear triggers; occurrences that are seemingly of no significance, but that are in a certain situation able to set a series of events into motion. One example of that is the constitutional breakdown in 1963 when serious violence erupted in Nicosia. A Greek Cypriot police patrol, ostensibly checking identification documents, stopped a Turkish Cypriot couple on the edge of the Turkish quarter. In reaction to this, a hostile crowd gathered in which shots were fired and two Turkish Cypriots were killed.

When the news of the murders began to spread, members of the underground organizations began shooting and taking hostages. Turkish forces occupied a strong position at St. Hilarion Castle, north of Nicosia, dominating the road to Kyrenia on the northern coast. Both sides began to fight to control the road, which became an important combat area. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots also fought in Nicosia along the line separating the Greek and Turkish quarters of the city, which was later called the Green Line. Turkish Cypriots were not concentrated in one area but lived all over the island, making their position precarious. As a result, the Turkish representatives quickly ceased participating in the government.

Civil War in Cyprus

It is clear that these occurrences, even though they triggered the Cyprus Civil War which would last for almost a year, are not the sole reason for the Turkish representatives to stop participating in the joint government. Just before the beginning of the Cyprus Civil War, Makarios had proposed some important changes in the constitution which had been denied by the Turkish representation. The most important propositions were:

• to have the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President elected by the Greek-Cypriot dominated House of Representatives as a whole (not by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot members separately)
• to remove the veto powers of the Turkish-Cypriots
• to reduce the Turkish-Cypriot component in the civil and military arms of government
• to abolish the separate community voting on fiscal, electoral, and some other matters
• to unify the municipalities

The constitution of Cyprus had these bicommunal features which slowed administration and gave rise to continuing disagreement and irritation, which culminated finally in armed violence between members of the two communities. This, on its turn, led to the breakdown of the constitution and the Cyprus Civil war. Many argue that in the breakdown of the constitution the last possibility of a fair solution was lost, inevitably leading to an eventual breakdown of all cooperation in 1974. Others argue that Turkish Cypriots were never equally represented in the government of 1963 and were thereby already discriminated. However, in 1964 Turkey lost, or resigned from, its entire voice in the joint efforts to keep the two ethnic groups on Cyprus together in cooperation. The constitution of 1960 had lasted only three years.

Onwar.com Countrystudies Cypnet all accessed 19 May 2007

Proximate Causes

Determining the causes of a conflict is not always that easy. Generally there are a number of factors which grow before and throughout the escalation of the conflict. Even after the causes are identified it is a lot harder to categorize these as same causes can be grouped under different topics. Here we will have brief look at the proximate causes of the Cyprus conflict where proximate causes are very shortly explained by Gerd Junne as specific situational circumstances (e.g. increasing insecurity on streets, frequency of political arrests, capital flight).

Increasing Tensions Between EOKA and TMT

One of the proximate causes of the Cyprus dispute can be the Greek-supported organization EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). This organization’s main aim is to unite Cyprus with Greece since Cyprus considers Greece as her motherland. It can be interpreted as a part of a wider Pan-Hellenic movement of Megali Idea (Great Idea). Megali Idea is simply aimed at the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire. The idea of Enosis is a deep-rooted ambition of Greeks however after 1929 Greeks tried to emphasize this idea through the unification of Cyprus and Greece. No need to say that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey opposed Enosis and reacted against it by claiming that there will be no chance of life for Muslims in Cyprus. Although this idea is actually a systemic cause its implications constitutes the part of the proximate cause which is the increasing tension between the EOKA and TMT. In 1958, Turkish reactions led to the creation of TMT, the Turkish Resistance organization, against the violent actions of EOKA. Turkish Cypriots believed that this is the only way to protect their interests and identity against the Greek Cypriot threat. In reality, EOKA aimed to revolt against the British rule in the island however it led to the outbreak of violence in 1955. The attempts for breaking the deadlock in the island held under the name of maintaining a conference between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Turkey immediately accepted this invitation, nevertheless, Greece was hesitant. The Greek newspapers, almost without exception, criticized the extension of the invitation to Turkey and the omission of the Cypriots and branded the proposals as a trap designed to forestall the forthcoming debate on Cyprus at the United Nations and to procure the indefinite postponement of self-determination (1). The Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu at the London Conference on Cyprus, August 1955, clearly implied that with the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey accepted that Greece has once for all abandoned her claims based on the "Megali Idea" and that in return Turkey has accepted the boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Lausanne (2). However, it is obvious that both sides are still not convinced about each others’ aims and there is still an antagonism between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Attacks Against Turks (1974)

Another important cause of the intense antagonism is rooted in the violent attacks against to the Turkish Cypriots in the period after 1974. The Turkish quarters in Limassol, Larnaca, Baf (Paphos) and Magosa (Famagusta) were attacked and mostly overrun by Greek Cypriot national guards and Greek armed forces. Thousands of male Turkish Cypriot inhabitants were gathered, arrested and imprisoned as hostages in various detention centers under inhuman conditions and many of them were killed. As a result of the forced collection of the male population, Turkish Cypriot women and left defenseless against armed Greek Cypriot forces. In 20 July 1974, the Old City of Magosa (Famagusta) and the three Turkish suburbs of Baykal, Sakarya and Karakol are attacked. Turkish Cypriots were hammered by heavy artillery, mortars, rifles and even Russian T34 tanks. In the night of July 20, Turks living in the suburbs were secretly removed into the Old City through a tunnel under the walls which they eventually left their homes and everything behind. Next day, when the Greeks discovered what had happened, they resumed their attacks against the Old City, now crammed with 12,000 people (3). This violence continued nearly a month. The Greek attacks on Turkish Cypriot civilians in Magosa condemned by the international public and media. A German tourist, Ingrid Hebil, who was in Magosa at the time, was interviewed by 'The Voice of Germany' a week later. She stated that:

"The human mind cannot comprehend the Greeks' butchery. In the villages around Famagusta, the Greek national guard have displayed unsurpassed examples of savagery. Entering Turkish homes, they ruthlessly rained bullets on women and children. They cut the throats of many Turks, rounded up Turkish women, then raped them all. The defenseless Turkish women and young girls frantically tried to run away. These horrifying attacks are still going on in Famagusta and its environs. In a Turkish village, the Greeks rounded up Turkish men, women and children in a sports field and made them dig their own graves. Then they executed them all and dumped them in their graves. According to my estimate there were 100 such victims." (4)

Military Coup

Another proximate cause of the ongoing conflict in Cyprus is rooted in the events of 1974 in Cyprus. In November 1973, after the military coup in Greek part of the island, a junta came into power. To Turkey, it was once again clear that Athens was behind the coup, as well as that there was a close threat for the security of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. This led to the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, regarded as the Turkish Invasion. Turkish troops landed in the north of the island, Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots claimed that after they rejected the constitutional amendments in 1963, they were forced out of their positions in the government and furthermore, forced out of their land. Also the support of EOKA and Greek military for these policies against Turkish Cypriots created even more insecurity among the Turkish Cypriots. Consequently, Turkish intervention made under the right of protecting the Turkish Cypriots. They claimed that the intervention was essential to defend the vital interests of the Turkish Cypriots, which is a legal right under the Treaty of Guarantee and to secure the independence of Cyprus. “Operation Atilla” considered as an invasion and violation Human Rights by the European Commission of Human Rights in 1976 and 1983. The events in 1974 are considered as the burning point of the division of Cyprus and raised antagonism between the two sides. This can be considered as an immediate trigger; however, it also carries the characteristics of a proximate cause.

The last proximate cause can be shown as Turkish-Cypriots forcing Greek-Cypriots to migrate from the Turkish occupied lands and seizing of the Greek properties by Turks. This actually does not fully constitute a proximate cause but it looks rather a consequence. However if the post-1974 era is considered it can be deduced that this is one of the proximate causes of why the conflict continued to exist without too much de-escalation. We may add the missing Greeks who have not yet been found to this (5).

As it can be seen from this short analysis there are not too many proximate causes identifiable and even these can be analyzed also under other causes. It is important to depict that it is not necessary or essential for every conflict to have a number of proximate causes. In some, immediate triggers and systemic causes can be more identifiable, and Cyprus conflict is also one of those. It can also be seen that this analysis of proximate causes include siginifcantly more Turkish-sided causes than Greek-sided ones this is because there is not a real consensus between two parties on what are the conflict issues. And the Greek claims which are elaborated in conflict description does not have significant proximate causes, they are either systemic or immediate.

1. Crawshaw, Nancy "The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece" London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978, pp. 114-129. 2. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/www.cyprus-conflict.net/zorlu_in_london.html 3. http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/UNDERTHESHADOWOFTHEEMBARGO.pdf 4. Broadcast by the Voice of Germany on 30 July, 1974. 5. http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Cyprus/The+Parameters+of+the+Problem+and+the+Solution/

The Original Causes of the Conflict

In order to identify the underlying causes of the still-continuing ethno-nationalistic conflict on the island, which reached its zenith with the1974 intervention, we need to have a close look at the roots of the political ideologies that led to the sharp separation of the two communities. It is especially crucial to mention the sources and components of the nationalist ideas each side possesses.

Following the conquest of Constantinople, then the capital of the Byzantine Empire, by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the entire Greek mainland was brought under Ottoman rule. The Greeks were recognized as millet or a nation, which meant that they could freely maintain their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity, under the Greek Orthodox Church. The sultan granted the authority to the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople over matters which closely affected the daily lives of ordinary people. This gave them the opportunity to develop their own nationhood in terms of language, social institutions and values, customs and traditions, and their Orthodox Christian religion. On the other hand, the Turks did not go through such a process until the collapse of the Ottoman, as they lacked the numbers, sophistication, and the organizing ability of the Greeks. Their tardiness to do so did nothing but add to the rising national pride and self-confidence of their opponents, which came into being as they gained back their old territories following the establishment of the independent Greece in 1827. This self-confidence led to the birth of Megalo (Great) Idea, the belief in the necessity of revival of a greater Greek state to cover all the Greek speaking, Christian Orthodox of the old Byzantine. Naturally, this idea included union with their redeemed brothers in Cyprus, which was called enosis. It was not until Archbishop Makarios and Colonel George Grivas began to collaborate at the beginning of 1950s to unite the island with the Greek mainland that the Turkish Cypriots realized the extent of the danger, resulted by their negligence to counter the Greeks. In the end, Cyprus was not a nation to which anybody belonged. Had there been an institution among the Turkish Cypriot community corresponding, for instance, to the Greek Orthodox Church, the two sides would have deterred each other despite the numerical imbalance in the population. Consequently, the two Greek leaders met in 1951 and discussed the possibility of an armed struggle in the form of guerilla war against the Turkish Cypriots, during which they were aided by the Greek government in terms of arms, funds, propaganda work and diplomatic activity. It would be the struggle of the whole Greek Nation. Like the Greeks, the Turks later realized that they did draw a distinction between their being but an integral part of the Turkish nation, possessing a peculiar national identity and cultural heritage; and their being inhabitants and citizens of Cyprus. For them, Cyprus contained two ethnic groups, each belonging to a different nation. Why should they regard themselves as a Cypriot minority? But it would not be implausible to claim that they were indeed late to ask this question.

As Greek nationalism began to flower on the island in the 1960s, with Makarios’ determination to make Cyprus Greek by unilaterally abrogating the 1960 Accords, and at the very time that Greek Cypriot self-confidence was growing with economic prosperity, the Turkish Cypriots were for the most part confined to 30 or so ghettos throughout the island. Living in relative poverty, with no participation in the Cyprus government after December 1963, marginalized and almost forgotten by the Greeks, the Turkish community was denied many of its people’s basic human rights.

Religious difference

Religion was one of the key factors that led to the conflict between the two parties. In effect, the Greek side’s being Orthodox Christian, from the Turkish point of view, did not constitute a trouble for the Turkish Cypriots. But on the other hand, as the Greek nationalism adopted the very language of Orthodoxy, the Turks’ being Muslim was not very much appreciated by the Greeks in the island. The Greeks could not live together with the Muslim Turks so closely. One student of the Cyprus conflict can better understand this, as, for example, the leader of the Greeks during the period that led to the tragic events of 1974 was Makarios, who was Etnarch as well as president. He could, with no sense of impropriety, treat them also as his flock, sliding imperceptibility from religious to political declamation. The primary aims of Greek education, the instilling of religious belief and an unswerving patriotism, were hardly distinguishable.

A largely mythical mixture of notions of ethnic and cultural superiority, together with a view of history that stressed the inevitability of the ‘salvation’ of former Greek lands, and the need for perpetual resistance to the traditional enemy, the Turks were significant germs of the 1974 events. The Turks, on the other hand, did not act like saints during the period concerned. As an impediment to achieve a stable and pluralistic society Turkish attitudes were not much better than Greek ones. Their instinct to encounter the violence of the Greek Cypriots with violence and harsh propagandas absolutely accelerated the process of conflict before the events of 1974 together with the breakdown of any mediation attempts from the Turkish and Greek mainland, as well as from outside.

Independence or compliance?

The formal independence of Cyprus declared in 1960 was not actually a wanted independence. According to Makarios, independence was merely as a stepping-stone to the eventual achievement of enosis; the Turkish Cypriot leaders, knowing Makarios’ secreted agenda, would have preferred the British to stay, or, if it could not be returned to Turkey, that the island be divided and shared between Greece and Turkey. But instead of doing any of these things the guarantors gave Cyprus its independence. When we came to the end of the 1960s, this situation changed as the Greek side wanted to act independently from the Greece. This was due to the fact that Makarios, although he never opposed to the ideal of enosis in principle, thought that it was not practicable to speak of it since the time was not yet ripe for it; whereas, the Greek government, so to speak junta, willing enosis to be effected at once. Interesting is that there was a rising trend in the living standards of the Greek Cypriots, whereas, Greece was a backward country compared to them in economical terms. Moreover, democracy had given way to tyranny under the harsh regime of the Greek Colonels. This very change had led the Greek Cypriot middle-classes to be less fired by their once central nationalist ideal of enosis. This very conflict between the Greeks and the Greeks Cypriots led, simultaneously, to the massacres of the Turks on the island, after the interference of the Greek junta to the affairs of the island.

From a Greek Cypriot point of view, a triple tragedy occurred in 1974. First, the majority of the Greek Cypriots at least felt they were betrayed by Greece when the latter’s coup in Cyprus overthrew Makarios. This gave Turkey the excuse to invade Cyprus; hence the second and, for them, by far the greatest tragedy. And from the 1974 intervention afterwards the Cyprus problem for the Greeks was: how to get Turkey out of Cyprus, and how to reincorporate the ‘rebellious’ Turkish Cypriot ‘minority’ into what would quickly become a Greek state once more.

http://www.turkishgreek.org/kibris.htm (In Turkish) Anastasiou, Harry. “Communication Across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus.” Journal of Peace Research. 39.5 (2002): 581-596. Fisher, Ronald J. “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse.” Journal of Peace Research. 38.3 (2001): 307-326. Stavrinides, Zenon. The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood. Nicosia: CYREP, 1999.

Conflict Resolution

The Cyprus Conflict has been tried to be resolved for 45 years. Unfortunately all the attempts were unsuccessful and the problems escalated throughout this period. With the Turkish intervention in 1974 the conflict gained another dimension. Instead of the previous conflict issues like attacks and diminished rights the problem now became the presence of the Turkish army in the island. Then, with the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, bonds were once again loosened. European Union’s involvement also brought new aspects to the conflict and later on Southern Cyprus’ membership increased the EU’s role in the whole process. With the Annan Plan for Cyprus of 2004 (full text of the plan) it was observed that the Greeks were not eager for a solution while the Turks wanted a solution. In this part interests and positions of the parties will be reconsidered and a resolution proposal will be made. However it should not be forgotten that as it is explained in the previous paragraphs the common points of Greek and Turkish claims are nearly absent. So it is very hard to propose a solid resolution that both sides could agree upon.

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)

BATNA as described by Fisher and Ury in "Getting to Yes" refers to the best possible outcomes obtained without negotiation. If BATNA is far more desirable than any possible results of a negotiation process then that negotiation is somewhat destined to fail.

Today the Greek side has a significant BATNA which is the membership to the European Union. And since 1 May 2004 this alternative is already in force. The life standards and economic status of the Greek administered part of Cyprus (which is the member of the EU) is far better than those on the Turkish side. source. It has good trade and political relations with the rest of the world (except Turkey since Turkey does not recognize the Greek administration). On the other side Turkish Cyprus is totally dependent on Turkey both economically and politically. Turkish administration is not recognized internationally and there is a trade embargo. So Turkish Cypriots are unfortunately in a quite worse situation. Although there have been some attempts and promises that were made to abolish the embargo and start trade relations, they have not been fulfilled yet. Actually Turks only BATNA is holding the current right they have in their country of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Annan Plan for Cyprus was a good opportunity to resolve the conflict but the referendum in the Greek administred side showed that Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with the plan's provisions which gave equal rights to Turks (although in number of bodies seat allocations were made according the population it was not sufficient for Greeks). During an interview by the two Greek Cypriot newspapers Simerini and Alithia in August 2006, the former Foreign Minister of the Southern Cyprus, Nikos Rolandis's statements actually demonstrate the very essence of the problem in the Greek Cypriot side: ‘’subsequent to the refusal of the Annan Plan, it was finally evinced that we did not have any intention to solve the Cyprus question.’’ Rolandis, who points out that it is the Greek Cypriot side that have been more responsible for not getting to a solution since 1960, makes a self-criticism asserting that they have refused all the plans put onto the table in the last 45 years.

Annan Plan for Cyprus

The Annan Plan for Cyprus was criticized deeply by some Turkish politicians and analysts as it undermined Turkey’s interests. Also because Greece was actively involved in this whole process. But the Turks were not the ones who rejected the Annan Plan for Cyprus, the Greeks did. So why did it fail? The European Commission clearly pointed out: "an unique opportunity to bring about a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus issue has been missed." They were not the only ones dissapointed in the 'no' of the Greek Cypriots. Without elaborating on the exact contents of the Annan Plan for Cyprus and the concessions both the Turks and Greeks would have to agree with, it is often argued that the main problem of the Annan Plan for Cyprus is its failure to understand and capture the realities of Cyprus and the conflict. According to some sources the UN has made Cyprus into their example state: the one that other states in conflict could look to when it comes to finding a constructive solution. That is why the UN has devoted so much attention to the Cyprus conflict over the last decade. Example-state or not, Cyprus remains until now a clear example of how a hard it is to resolve such an escalated conflict, hardly what the UN wanted it to be. What went wrong? First of all, Annan worked as a formulator pf the solution from the very beginning. He had thought of an ideal formula way before the talks with the Cypriots, so whenever their proposals did not fit his, he had to change the plan instead of formulating a plan together from the beginning. Apart from that, both parties looked at the plan with a great degree of suspicion and thought of it as a tricky documents made up by someone who had essentially nothing to do with Cyprus or the conflict. The parties took the plan reluctantly to a referendum, thereby it had no political basis whatsoever. Another thing that made the plan fail was the fact that Annan focused on the Cypriots, instead of involving the Turkish and Greek governments, which also had considerable interests in the conflict. The conflict is, from a historical viewpoint, also a conflict between two clashing forces, Greek and Turkish nationalism. Therefore durable peace on Cyprus cannot be achieved without an active support of Greece and Turkey. Despite the fact that many positive steps were taken by both Greek and Turkish governments during Annan’s peace process, the governments were, nonetheless, careful about “not selling out” Cyprus to the “enemy”. But perhaps the biggest, mistake of Annan was his analysis of the conflict and neglect of the psychological barriers between the Cypriot communities. The Cypriot state was created in 1960 by outside powers rather against the real wishes of the Cypriot communities and in the midst of the struggle between enosis and taksim. Generally speaking, there is no Cypriot identity on the island other than dominant Greek and Turkish identities. A state which is normally based on the people is called nation. On Cyprus, there still exists no Cypriot nation supporting the Cypriot state.

Under these circumstances, it is rather doubtful whether it would be wise to push the Cypriot communities to reach an immediate agreement. Representing the international community at the highest level, the UN wants to see a quick result. This is understandable. Yet under the existing psychological barriers on the island, a forced togetherness, even if succeeds, would not actually solve the problem, but would make it even worse.

A more appropriate strategy Annan could have followed was arranging a four-sided conference in a neutral setting in which Greek and Turkish Cypriot administrations, as well as Athens and Ankara could participate from the very beginning. Such a meeting would have led the parties to communicate for a reasonably long time in which a preliminary agreement could likely appear. Following that, Annan could have helped the parties shape and improve their common points, while excluding non-common ones. This way, step by step, a formula that the parties could accept would have been reached eventually. In short, Annan should have started as a mediator and then played a more active role as a formulator.

Quote EC, People's Daily Online Why one more failure? Yrd. Doç. Dr. Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ

Problems and Solution

The main problems can be depicted as Turkey’s, Greece’s and EU’s involvement in the conflict. Since they are actively bargaining on their positions the real interests of Cypriots are not being considered. Negiotiation processes stuck in a deadlock position as none of these three parties focus on Cyprus but rather they prioritize their own positions and interests. It could be that it would be for the best if all of these three parties remain passive and let the UN and Cypriot communities resolve the issue in order to reach a successful agreement. Even Cyprus’ membership to the EU may be suspended until the conflict is resolved. The Annan Plan for Cyprus with some modifications or similar plans based on a confederational system should be proposed and explained in detail to the Cypriot communities. The manipulations of the both sides’ leaders must cease and let the people decide. It is then not about ideology; it is about the basic human right of living. Then again, the Annan Plan for Cyprus has shown in the past that it cannot offer a solution, perhaps it cannot in the future. The plan may evoke scepticism because it was not succesful before. It may therefore be neccesary to look for alternative solutions. One might also argue that one plan cannot evoke the process of integration of the two parts of Cyprus, and perhaps we should not desire it. Cooperations of the two parts of Cyprus, however desirable, is still a hurdle too far. A new plan, based on the Annan Plan for Cyprus should then propose a beginning of cooperation, for example a council similar to the EU: a council that can make decisions and propose policies in some areas of government, so that there is an umbrella institution taking care of some issues that affect the whole island. Such a council could, over time, become a joint government. It could also be the uniting factor; creating some sense of togetherness among the people on the island, so that it is no longer about 'us and them' but the inhabitants of the island as a whole.

In the light of the analysis of the Annan Plan for Cyprus it would however be wise not to push the Cypriots into an agreement, but try to establish a sense of 'nation' first. The lessons we have to learn from the Annan Plan are clear: we should not start the peace talks with a solution in our minds, but be patient and make the different parties make up their own solution. The UN (or another force) can guide this process as a mediator, but should not be actively involved in making up the solution. How do we establish a sense of nation? We have to start somewhere. One of the best ways to make people feel connected is by cooperation. Without making up the solution beforehand, the aim of peace talks could be to find some way of cooperating together, perhaps by the means of a small and modest council, equally representing the Cypriots and aiming at the beginning of cooperation. From that a sense of 'nation' can grow, and then the domino-effect, moderated by the UN, can do the rest.

The biggest problem in the Cyprus conflict is not the exact appearance of this solution. The main questions remain: how to create this willingness to cooperate, how to keep the EU (and perhaps Turkey and Greece) out of the conflict (since they all have interests in the conflict) and how to get to the point that such a joint institution (since it is not the first time this is to be attempted in the history of the island; and all have failed) can start working without being stopped in its tracks somewhere along the line? To start with the EU: it is vital, absolutely vital, that the UN is able to convince that party to stay out of the process of instating a joint institution. It should stay out of the talks: these should take place solely among representatives of the Turkish and Greek communities on the island itself, and the respresentatives of Ankara and Athens. If the UN fails to convince the EU that a solution will never come into place if it interferes, then the complexity of all the interests of all parties involved will remain a large obstacle on the way to a solution, perhaps even too large to overcome. The same might even go for Turkey and Greece, it is debatable whether they should have a say in the solution talks. Even though the Annan Plan may have failed because of them being held out, it could also complicate matters if they are allowed in. That would also mean that the UN must propose an agreement between Turkey and Greece (and to a lesser extent the EU) that they will keep their noses out of the conflict solution talks. This will probably be the hardest step in the process, because all the parties have interests and history on the island, and they are historically not used to letting the people of Cyprus speak and decide for themselves what they want. It is high time they can though, because up till now it has always been about the political aspirations and interests of the different parties and seldomly about the wishes of the Cypriots. Whenever the Cypriots have tried to influence their political fate it has always been brutally slain down or resulted in a civil war. Hopefully, by keeping Turkey, Greece and the EU out of the conflict solution this tendency will end and the Cypriots can find at last some sense of peace and togetherness. One way of keeping Turkey and Greece out of the process is applying sanctions to them. If they become subject to some economic and political restrictions they will need to cooperate. In this sense EU's role may be a bit complex. Although it should also be kept out before it's withdrawal it must imply a few restrictions to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey (but equally) and then it should say that the problem is nomore a concern of the union. The relations will be resumed after the conflict is resolved. Until then the EU will neither act nor advise concerning the subject. Since the UN will be the only institution that will be concerned with the issue. It's mechanisms can also be used as tools to help keeping Greece and Turkey out of the problem.

If the situation remains the way it is now, it is very likely that this will lead to another shed of violence. The situation is far from stable, since the island is still inhabited by two different groups with their own culture and no sense of identity apart from the dominant Greek and Turkish identity. Even if this doesn't lead to more violence, it will not lead to a long-term solution, for the parties will not come together or cooperate if not forced to, as is clear from the past. Some debate is possible on the neccesity of solving the conflict. If this situation can remain stable and both parties have their own part of the island, why seek a different status quo? First of all, because the UN is still heavily involved in keeping the parties apart. There are still militant groups active on both sides. Secondly, because not many people are content with the situation; most Cypriots accept it, but that is not the same as being happy or content with it. The situation might seem stable, but it only appears that way. So for a peaceful and constructive future, the conflict will have to be resolved at one time or another, so that the past can be the basis for a different future.

A joint institution can only work and keep on working if it has the mandate of the majority of the Cypriots. If, by having equal representation and giving both sides a strong voice in the cooperation, the Cypriots feel treated respectfully and can have a sense of influence, willingness to cooperate can grow from that. In its turn, this will possibly make sure that a joint government can keep working: as long as it has the support of the Cypriots all might turn out quite well. But it has to start somewhere by listening to each other and devising a plan together, beginning small, and growing together from that.

An interesting story: In the 1979 UNSC meeting, Turkey, as always, addresses to the Greek Cypriots as the ‘Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus’. The Greek Cypriot representative, Mavromatis, blows up following this statement and says: ‘’150 UN members have recognized us as the Republic Cyprus. Thus, it is not significant whether or not you do so.’’ Then the Turkish Ambassador, Orhan Eralp, responds to him: ‘’The Cyprus issue is not an arithmetic calculation of addition. This is an algebraic equation, and the ‘x’ of this equation is Turkey. Even if the whole world recognizes you, this equation cannot be solved as long as Turkey does not recognize you. Now, if you want, you can even call yourself ‘’The Greek Empire of Cyprus .‘’ (Laughs in the room…)