CLEARANCE OF THE LANDMINES IN THE TURCO-SYRIAN BORDER

2006

OBLIGATIONS, ACTIONS TAKEN, PROBLEMS ARISED

• 780 km length

• 506.000 da (as twice large as Cyprus)

• Out of the 920.000 anti-personnel landmines that the Turkish army laid in borders of the country, 660.000 were laid along the Syrian border.

• One landmine per 500 square meters can be expected.

• Most of the land in near the Turkish-Syrian border falls under the legal category of “Forbidden Military Zone in the First and Second Degrees” (i.e., public land administrated by the Turkish military).

• Some of it is formerly privately-owned farmland nationalized during the 1956 demarcation.

• In 1956 when smugglers shot two Turkish customs agents dead, the Turkish army laid mines along Turkey’s borders with Syria

• The anti-personnel landmines were meant to discourage the smuggling activity between the two countries. After the beginning of the insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 1984, the Turkish-Syrian border was utilized by the insurgents also, which prompted the Turkish army to lay more anti-personnel landmines between 1989 and 1998.

• Turkey has not led any more anti-personnel landmines since 1998.

• In the 1998-2002 period, the relations between Turkey and Syria warmed up, and as the insurgency subsided, Turkey and Syria held talks to demine the border zone.

• They made a formal agreement in 2003 to that effect.

• Syrians have cleared minefields on the Turkish side of the border and in the buffer zone totaling 250 square meters where they have planted cotton and olive trees.

• Now the Syrians carry out agricultural activities in the Turkish side of the border.

• Production of antipersonnel mines ceased concurrently with a moratorium on the sale and transfer of antipersonnel mines in January 1996. Turkey’s production facilities for antipersonnel mines were then gradually phased out of service. Previously, Turkey had produced both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

• The use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish Armed Forces was banned by a directive from the Chief of General Staff on 26 January 1998

• During the Ecevit government, in the same direction with the recommendatory decision of the NSC, the Council of Ministers made the decision to demine the border. But no action was taken.

• As of late 2002, the Turkish army had only cleared a total of 14.000 landmines in the entire country, at a rate of 400/year.

• In 2003, the Turkish army bought one Bozena flail system from Slovakia and one Aardvark flail unit from the United Kingdom. The military had initially planned to buy up to 16 demining machines, including “tiller” type machines in addition to the Bozena and Aardvark, and considered Croatian and German machines, they have not yet purchased any more machines.

• Although they estimated to complete the task by themselves in two to three years, this obviously is not realistic at their current nationwide rate of 4.000/year, given the 660.000 mines along the Syrian border.

• Bu nedenler mayınların kaldırılması tekrar gündeme gelmiş, konu önce KKK’ye daha sonra Milli Savunma Bakanlığı’na havale edilmiş, bakanlıkça teklif toplanmış, çok yüksek maliyet (milyar doların üstünde) ve ihale yapılması işinde uzman olunmadığı gerekçesiyle konu işin uzmanı Maliye Bakanlığı’na havale edilmiş.

• Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Genel Sekreteri Kurmay Albay Mustafa Küçükayan: “Yapılan incelemeler neticesinde, teçhizatın tedariki durumunda mayın temizleme faaliyetinin özeliği nedeniyle, bakım, onarım, işletme ve idame konularında sorunlarla karşılaşılabileceği, temizleme faaliyetinin uzun zaman alacağı ve bu maksatla tahsis edilen kaynağın çok üzerinde yüksek bir maliyetle gerçekleştirilebileceği belirlenmiştir.

• Yapılan incelemeler sonucunda ihale bedellerinin astronomik rakamlara ulaşması ve MSB bütçesinde bu miktarda ödeneğin bulunmaması sebebiyle mayın temizleme faaliyetinin Maliye Bakanlığı’nca daha maliyet etkin olarak ihale edilebileceği değerlendirilmiş ve bu amaçla yapılacak ihalenin planlama ve icra aşamalarında TSK tarafından uzman personel desteği sağlanarak Maliye Bakanlığı’nca gerçekleştirilmesinin daha uygun olacağı kararlaştırılmıştır.

• Maliye Bakanlığı, bütçe imkânları ile karşılanmasının mümkün olmayacağını değerlendirerek, bu hizmet alımı ihalesinin “Yap-İşlet-Devret” usulü ile yapılmasına karar vermiştir

• 15 Şubat 2006 tarihinde Mardin ilinde yapılan ihaleye üç ayrı firma teklif vermiştir.

• İhaleye teklif veren firmalar:

• İsraillilerin Ortak Girişimi: İsrailli üç adet mayın temizleme firması ile İsrailli tarım firması (TAHAL vb) yerli ortak olarak seçtikleri Sarsılmaz Şirket ile beraber teklif vermiştir.

• Antakya’dan Mavi Deniz adlı tarım firması ile Quadro adlı İsrail firması, diğeri Alman üç ayrı mayın temizleme firması ve bir tarım firmasının (İsrail firması deniliyor) ortak girişimi: Bu ortak girişimde mayın temizleme ihalesinde ihale makamı ve kıta amiri olan Maliye Bakanı’nın oğlunun ortak girişimin (gizli) ortağı olduğu mayın temizleme işini takip eden çok sayıda yerli firma tarafından duyum olarak iletilmektedir.

• Countermine Şirketi: Hırvatistan’da Hırvatistan firması olarak faaliyet gösteren, aslında İsveçli bir endüstri mühendisine ait olan firma. Countermine Şti.’nin MOTT adlı bir İsrail şirketini kamufle ettiği ve esas patron şirketin OFER ailesi olduğu söyleniyor.

• Yerli firmalar ihale ticari açıdan kazançlı olmadığından, Mardin ilinde mayın temizlemek ve tarım yapmak için teklif verememişlerdir

• NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agnecy), kuruluşunun gereği olarak kar amacı olmadan “NO LOSS NO PROFIT” anlayışı ile görev yapan bir lojistik kuruluştur. NAMSA is an institution

• 1998 yılından bugüne kadar NAMSA tarafından imha edilen kara mayınlarının sayısı 3 milyondur. NAMSA halen Afganistan’da Kabil ve Kandahar meydanlarının etrafındaki mayınların temizliği işini yapıyormuş ve bu işlerin finansmanı NATO ENF bütçesinden karşılanıyormuş.

• Türkiye’nin Suriye sınırındaki mayınların temizlenmesi konusunda bizim Maliye Bakanlığımız NAMSA ile temas etmiş, ancak daha sonra bu işi NAMSA’nın katkısı olmadan kendisi yapmaya karar vermiş.

• Yb. Peter: “We too were surprised that the Finance Ministry were taking the lead in this demining business, and that is the main reason we offered our help, because it seemed likely they would get the wrong advice from sources with vested interests, as often happens with such projects. İf they had taken our advice, any questions could have been deflected to NAMSA. We are stil interested.

• In June 2004, PKK/Kongra-Gel and HPG ended a unilateral cease-fire they called in 1999 in favor of a future, bilateral cease-fire.

• In 2005-2006 numerous mine incidents were reported in the media as armed attacks intensified, with the PKK/Kongra-Gel usually cited as responsible for using the mines. As reported in the media, most incidents involved antivehicle mines, including command-detonated mines.

• Turkey attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005.

• She made a statement on universalization “which assigns... certain tasks to the States Parties concerning ‘armed non-state actors,’ provided that they are ‘in a position to do so’ and ‘as appropriate.’ Therefore... we take the view that when engagement with ‘armed non-state actors’ is contemplated, the concerned State Party should be informed and its consent would be necessary for such an engagement to take place.”

• On 18 July 2006, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party committed to a ban on antipersonnel mines by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

• In the last 50 years, more than 3.000 people (mostly civilians) killed and about 7.000 maimed by the landmines.

• The countrywide landmine casualty: about 900 killed and 1.000 injured in the last two decades

THE ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM OF THE ETA AND THE PKK

Kıvanç Sağır - 2005

Terrorism is destruction of people or property by people not acting on behalf of an established government for the purpose of redressing a real or imaginary injustice attributed to an established government and aimed directly or indirectly at an established government (Hill). Most official definitions of terrorism also contain the word "unlawful" or "criminal" as part of the definition. There are some categories of terrorism such as revolutionary, political, religious, social, domestic, transnational, ethnocentric and ethno-nationalist terrorism. Ethno-nationalist terrorism, as Hoffman (1999) puts it, is also called “traditional” or “ideological” terrorism. Ethno-nationalist terrorism may espouse ideological concerns which are closely held beliefs. However, the primary reason for their existence is their identity with an ethnic or national group. These groups are most often minorities and they usually perceive themselves as oppressed or threatened by dominant majority groups (Spencer). They mostly want to establish their own states with the understanding of self-determination, which means the decision by the people of a nation as to what form of government they shall have, independently, without reference to the wishes of any other nation (IMUNA).

The two separatist terror organizations, the ETA and the PKK, can be regarded as ethno-nationalist terrorist groups. Both the ETA and the PKK aims to lead to the establishment their own countries with the understanding of self-determination. The ETA demands the separation of the Basque region from Spain and France, while the PKK demands that of the so called Kurdish region from Turkey. Despite the similarity between the aims and the methods of these two groups, there are some certain differences between the grounds of the ETA and the PKK.

The ETA has used terrorism in hopes of forming an independent Basque state in parts of northern Spain and southwestern France. The Basques are a linguistically and culturally distinct Christian group that has lived since the Stone Age in the mountainous region that straddles the border between modern-day Spain and France and have managed to preserve their culture until the present times. The Basques have their own culture, for instance their literature, music style, cloth style, drinking style are different from the Spanish, own language, Euskera, an ancient one meaning the expression of Basque “essence” and the mythical bearer of Basque national culture, and even own genetic features (Narváez).

The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) was formed in 1959 by young activists angered by the Spanish dictator Franco’s suppression, which lasted between 1937 and 1975, of the Basque people, in order to replace the regime of Franco with a socialist system. Under Franco, the Spanish government had often met the ETA violence with violence, and terror suspects were sometimes tortured. These increased the attacks of the ETA. Later on, especially after the death of Franco in 1975, their objective has become to separate Basque from Spain and to establish a free state. At the revolutionary extreme, the ETA currently wishes to take over the government from the Spanish and control the state for their own benefit. This is because, the Basques, who have enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy over the centuries under Spanish and French rule, but who have never had an own independent state, has no longer wanted to live under the rule of any other state (Narváez). This understanding is what we call “self-determination”. With this objective, the ETA has been in a terrorist struggle against Spain and rarely France.

On the other hand, the hope of the PKK is forming an independent Kurdish state under the authority of the current leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in the Mesopotamia region, which the Kurdish calls Kurdistan and which covers the territories of eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, western Iran, and parts of Syria. The Kurds are a group of about 10 to 15 million people united by ethnicity and language who hail from so-called Kurdistan. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims; others follow other forms of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and an ancient Kurdish faith. The Kurdish, like the Basques, has continued living under the rule of the Turkish states throughout the history. However, the Kurdish people, in contrast to the Basques, had been living with satisfaction under the Turkish rule and had regarded themselves as Turkish. The Kurdish had never demanded to get separated from the Turkish rule until the 1920s. In the 1920s, particularly after the establishment of the independent national Turkish state and the French occupation of Syria, the Kurdish started to attack to Turkey by taking the support of the foreign countries mostly France (Öztürk, Kasadaki Dosyalar). These attacks were mainly in the form of rebellion –the most famous of these rebellions is that of Sheikh Said- and continued until the 1970s.

The Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) was born out of the leftist student organizations in Turkey in the 1970s. The current leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, was a Kurdish student at Ankara University's Political Science Faculty. He got the Marxist-Leninist ideas here. Öcalan says, “I was about 20 years old. I was in a very pacifist position. In the contradictions of Ankara, I was also somehow conservative. I was attending Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s conferences and I remember I was very affected of his ideas. I was dealing mostly with bourgeois philosophy and reading this kind of stuff. I was also performing my ritual prayer in Maltepe mosque. 1970 was just the turning point of everything for me. That year I got a book called “The Alphabet of Socialism”. Everything changed for me after reading this book” (Birand, Apo ve PKK). THKP-C (Turkey People's Liberation Party-Front) leader, Mahir Çayan’s ideas influenced Ocalan. According to Mumcu “Çayan saw armed struggle as the only way to revolution. For him, without vanguard, armed resistance they did not have chance to make a revolution. For this reason, they had to establish a political party.” As a result, on 27 November 1978, PKK was formally but clandestinely established in the province of Diyarbakır with the goal of the establishment of an independent socialist Kurdish state. It is true to say that the objective of the PKK, similar to that of the ETA, includes “self-determination” of the Kurdish.

Like all ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups, the ETA and the PKK uses demonstratively symbolic acts of violence to generate publicity and rally support by calling attention to the weakness of the government to withstand the nationalist expression they defend and thus embarrass and force it into acceding to the group’s demands. Robbery, extortion, kidnapping, bombing and murdering are both the ETA’s and the PKK’s main tactics along with breaking their own ceasefires. Since its first attack on August 15, 1984, the PKK’s 18.000 attacks resulted in over 30.000 murders in only Turkey while the ETA murdered about 800 people in the last forty five years in Spain and France (Terror Organizations in Europe). Moreover, in the last years, both of these groups have started to effectively sabotage Turkish and Spain tourism by murdering many tourists from other countries.

Besides their enemies, the ETA and the PKK have also destroyed the lives of their own members by forcing them to carry out all the wild duties they are given. When their members do not carry out their duties by entirely leaving their private lives, they are regarded as traitor. Bernard Atxaga, a Basque novel author, in his novel “The Lone Woman”, presents the dramatic story of a former ethno-nationalist terrorist, who is condemned to be left alone by the people around her, of the ETA. Atxaga says “If a member does not carry out a duty, behaves in a way contrary to the rules of the organization or wants to leave it, he/she is damned, punished being dismissed from the organization, and the relation with his/her is cut off; shortly that member is left alone.” On the other hand, as Osman Öcalan, the brother of Abdullah Öcalan, states, “the lifestyle in the PKK has become restricted; this did not permit different opinions to be suggested. PKK did not let people’s private life, moreover, it asked from the people sacrificed lives. Every one who joined the struggle had to leave their social lives. This situation was obstructing PKK’s embracement everybody.” Moreover, the PKK has killed many Kurdish villages in the Southeast declaring them as “state collaborators” (Kerkük Kurdistane).

In order to widen their base of supporters for their terrorist attacks and to make their voice heard, the ETA and the PKK made agreements with political parties in Turkey or Spain. Although the ETA-linked Batasuna party was banned by the Spanish Supreme Court, the DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front), with which Abdullah Öcalan signed a protocol of cooperation at the end of 1996, has still been working with the aim of supporting the current PKK and the independence of the so-called Kurdistan. What's more, it is stated by the authorities that the ETA and the PKK has made some agreements on cooperation with each other. For example, in August 1983, the representatives of the Catalonia Tierra Libra, the Basque, the ETA, the Corsica Liberation Movement, the IRA, and the PKK have held a meeting. In 1970’s the ETA militants were trained in El Fetih Camp in Palestine, and in the same year THKP-C militants were there as well. Moreover, the PKK-linked DEV-SOL and the ETA made a joint declaration in Hamburg on 2 January 1984 (Terror Organizations in Europe). With these cooperations, both the ETA and the PKK have got much stronger and increased their lethal attacks against Spain and Turkey.

The ETA and the PKK have been significant dangers for Spain and Turkey for years. Since both Spain and Turkey have not been individually able to cope with these dangers, it would probably be the best for both of these countries to make collaboration against the ETA and the PKK, which are globally linked with each other. This is because dealing with ethno-nationalist terrorism requires the kind of engagement, capacity building and cooperative problem solving that conflict resolution practitioners and theorists have been working on for more than generation. When faced with a terrorist attack, national security policy makers invariably have to think about how they should respond in the days, weeks and months that follow. Given the pressing decisions they have to make, their timeframes have to be short. Otherwise such terrorist acts will cover around us for much more years.

PKK ve Abdullah Öcalan Sunumu

Kıvanç Sağır - 2005

• What is terrorism? Is PKK a terrorist organization?
• Committing of various violent illegal acts which physically or mentally harm the well being of an individual or group of people with the aims of promoting a political or religious ideology.
• The premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant (civilian) targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

• PKK is a terrorist organization.
• The PKK remains on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations, and following Turkish and U.S. pressure, the European Union added the PKK to its list of terrorist organizations in May 2002.

• Its main goal is known in the public opinion as the setting up of an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. But the reality is different.
• The Kurds are a group of about 25 million people united by ethnicity and language who hail from Kurdistan, a region spanning eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, western Iran, and parts of Syria and Armenia. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims; others follow other forms of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and an ancient Kurdish faith.
• In keeping with its Marxist ideology, the PKK initially saw itself as part of the world-wide Marxist revolution.
• The Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) was born out of the leftist student organizations in Turkey in the 1960s.
• In 1970, the Federation of Debate Clubs was reorganized as the Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev-Genc) under radical leadership.
• The Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA), led by young men of Kurdish origin, wanted to stage a revolution in the countryside.
• Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish student at the Ankara University's Political Science Faculty, joined the Revolutionary Youth Organization. He got the Marxist-Leninist ideas here.
• Öcalan: “"20 yaşlarında ya vardım, ya yoktum. Çok pasif bir durumdaydım. Ankara'nın da verdiği çelişkiler içinde biraz da muhafazakar bir yapıdaydım... Necip Fazıl Kısakürek'in konferanslarına gider, bayağı da etkilenirdim. Daha çok burjuva felsefesi ile ilgileniyor, bu tip yazar ve kitaplarını okuyordum. Bir yandan da Maltepe Camii'nde namaz kılardım. Din ile felsefenin yer değiştirmeye başladığı bir dönemdi... 1969'da meslek okulunu bitirdim ve hemen ardından Diyarbakır'da kadastro memurluğu yaptım. İşte her şeyin dönüm noktası 1970 tarihidir. O sıralarda elime Sosyalizmin Alfabesi diye bir kitap geçti. Kitabı okuduktan sonra her şey değişti..." (Apo ve PKK, Mehmet Ali Birand, sayfa, 79, 80)
• THKP-C (Turkey People's Liberation Party-Front) leader, Mahir Çayan’s ideas influenced Ocalan.
• Uğur Mumcu: “Çayan, silahlı eylemleri tek yol olarak görüyordu. Öncü savaşı ve silahlı propaganda olmadan devrim yapılamazdı. Bunlar için de bir parti kurmak gerekiyordu.”
• Mumcu: “Abdullah Öcalan, 1973 yılında bir bahar günü birkaç arkadaşı ile birlikte Ankara’da Çubuk Barajı’na gidiyor ve parti kurup gerilla yöntemleri ile ayaklanma hazırlamak gerektiğini anlatıyor ve PKK’nın temellerini atıyordu.”
• “Liberation of Kurds!”
• On 27 November 1978, PKK was formally but clandestinely established in the district of Diyarbakir.
• Öcalan wanted to stage a communist revolution by guerrilla warfare and establish a separate Kurdish state.
• PKK lacked arms as well as militants.
• In 1979, Öcalan escaped to Syria, although he was deserted.
• Mumcu: “Askerlik Şubesi Öcalan'ı adım adım izliyordu. 26 Temmuz 1977 günü yeniden son yoklama çağrı pusulası göndermişti. Ancak Öcalan izini kaybettirmeyi başarmıştı. Bu yüzden son çağrı pusulası kardeşi Mehmet Öcalan'a tebliğ edildi. 26 Eylül 1978 gününden sonra da son yoklama kaçağı olarak aranmaya başlandı. Öcalan o günlerde Diyarbakır'daydı. Diyarbakır'ın Ofis Mahallesi'nde eşi Kesire ile Günaydın Apartmanı'nda kalmakta; evde günlerce kitap okumaktaydı."
• Öcalan: “ Kaydımı fakültede tutarak askerliği de 8 yıl ertelemiştim.” (Apo ve PKK, Mehmet Ali Birand, sayfa 89)
• It is stated that in 1980s the main aim of the movement is to achieve freedom for the Kurdish people.
• In 1980, on the eve of the September 12 military coup, PKK leaders left Turkey for the Syrian-controlled Beka`a valley.
• And later to fight alongside them during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This cooperation then led to various regional movements opening their territories to the PKK.
• In 1982, with initial financial assistance from Kurdish businessmen and workers in Libya, some political backing from the Iraqi Kurds, and training grounds in Lebanon and Syria, the PKK was set to begin activities.
• It recruited lower class Kurds such as the peasants who form the majority of the population.
• Its Central Committee has always been made up mainly of commanders in the field.
• It has always been under the control of its leader Abdullah Öcalan.
• Osman Öcalan: “PKK, Kürdistan’da çalışmaya başladığında, her şey Başkan için gibi bir anlayışla çalıştı. Her şey Başkan’ın etrafında dönüp yürütülüyordu. Başkana bağlılık yavaş yavaş temel hedef oldu. Kürt ulusuna bağlılık ise sürekli geride kaldı. Yani amaç yer değiştirdi; yurtseverliğin yolu Abdullah Öcalan’a bağlılık olarak gösterildi. Bu, yanlış ve yerinde olmayan bir düşünceydi.”

• The PKK killing spree started on August 15, 1984.
• Öcalan decided in March 1985 to set up the Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army (ARGK).
• After the PKK's first attacks in 1984, a decision taken by Turkey to organize and arm Kurdish tribes known to be close to the state was a vital turning point in the conflict. The Motherland Party (ANAP) administration under the prime ministry Turgut Ozal, created the "temporary village guards”. The creation of the village guards system was the first in a series of decisions which would turn the Kurdish problem into a major, bloody conflict in the following years.
• Birand was warning Turkey: “Nihayet, Kürt sorunun bölgemizin önümüzdeki yıllardaki en önemli konusu olacağını düşünerek, silahlı mücadeleden çok, uzun vadeli hareket edip ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel önlemler hazırlamamız ve daha fazla vakit geçirmeden uygulamaya girmemiz acaba daha akılcı bir yaklaşım sayılmaz mı?” (Milliyet, 31.7.1987)
• As soon as the village guards system was established, more and more attacks were recorded against civilians.
• Öcalan: ''Bu isyanlar için en küçük bir engel bile yeterlidir. Kürtlere devletin saldığı ceza, dağa çıkmaları, korkuyla yaşamaları PKK'yı çıkarttı. Çıkış nedeni doğru değerlendirilmeli.'' (İmralı)
• The PKK also attacked many Kurdish villages in the Southeast declaring them as "state collaborators".
• By 1987, the PKK had managed to get better organized and had recruited thousands of sympathizers.
• The turning point for the Kurdish issue was in March 1989, when the National Security Council decided to launch a major military and psychological crackdown on Kurdish separatists.
• Until then, the organization was blamed for terrorizing the region with raids on villages and civilians. But in a 1990 party congress it decided to cease all activities that could lead to civilian casualties and to concentrate more on military targets and political struggle.
• Öcalan decided to redirect human rights violations away from PKK toward the Turkish State.
• Thus began a propaganda and disinformation campaign in Europe through cultural associations of Kurdish guest workers and political/cultural associations set up by Kurdish activists in exile.
• By 1990 it had became obvious that the Marxist-Leninist (hence atheist) PKK was unable to draw the mass support it needed from a society in which religious sentiment was very strong. Ocalan recognized the importance of religion as another support mechanism. Also, ties were forming between the Iranian Islamic Republic and PKK.
• At its second National Congress in May 1990, the PKK decided to establish friendly relations with religious movements that were considered to truly fight against the regime. It also decided "to exist within a legal socialist party with our mass forces . . ., to pull the Turkish popular masses and the left-wing forces into the struggle against the special warfare put into practice in Kurdistan, and to propagate for the brotherhood of the two people in order to activate this".
• Their activity became more visible at the beginning of the 1990s. They were identified by the local public as "Hizballah".
• In March 1993 the PKK signed a "cooperation protocol" with the "Hizballah Kurdish Revolutionary Party" aimed at ending the conflict and finding "methods for a joint struggle against the Turkish state."
• Öcalan: “Bir dönem Hizbullah ile aramızda birbirimizin bölgesine girmeme ve faaliyetlerine karışmama, hatta düşmana karşı birlikte hareket tarzı konusunda anlaşma yapıldı. Ancak bu anlaşma fazla gündemde kalmadı.” (İmralı)
• Between 1990 and 1993, PKK benefited from the lack of a coherent policy on the part of the Turkish state. The state’s leadership consistently underestimated these issues:
• There was a power vacuum in northern Iraq following the Gulf War of 1990-1991,
• There was an escalating risk environment around Turkey's borders,
• There was overt and covert propaganda against Turkey, playing on the human rights aspect.
• Since 1994, the PKK has repeatedly been calling for a cease-fire to be followed by dialogue to find a lasting, peaceful solution to the conflict within the boundaries of a sovereign Turkey.
• At the end of 1994, the PKK took its diplomatic efforts a step further and issued a formal "Declaration of Intent". In this Declaration it specifically said that it regards the follo groups as legitimate targets of attacks:
• members of the Turkish armed forces and the Gendarmerie,
• members of the Turkish contra-guerilla forces,
• members of the Turkish intelligence services,
• persons designated as village guards by Turkish authorities.
• On April 12, 1995, representatives of Turkish Kurds, not allowed to voice their aspirations in parliament, set up a Kurdish Parliament in exile to further efforts for a peaceful solution.
• In order to make the organization's voice heard in the western regions of Turkey, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan signed a protocol of cooperation with the DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front) organization at the end of 1996.

• The PKK tried to spread its operations to the Black Sea and Inner Anatolia. It started undertaking actions in Black Sea cities like Ordu and Giresun following the difficult situation it was forced into in the southeast Anatolia region.

• Since 1984, 17,179 attacks resulted in over 30 thousand murders. 3,489 soldiers, 180 police officers and 1,144 armed village guards were murdered. Among the 4276+ civilians massacred there were 501 children, 512 women.

• PKK’s annual budget is estimated to be $86 million.
• Some of the financial sources of the PKK:
• Revenues obtained from the "special nights" organized by branch organizations in Europe
• Aid campaigns periodically organized by the party
• Grants and subscriptions
• Sales of publications
• Revenues obtained from commercial establishments belonging to the organization
• Money collected through robbery
• Money collected through drug trafficking and arms-smuggling
• Extortion
• "Aid" received through intimidation from constructors and merchants running business in the region
• Transfer of money to the organization from the people entitled to payments in European countries, under refugee status
• Abdullah Öcalan’s relations with other countries (Holland, France, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Armenia, Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Italy, etc.)
• Öcalan: “Bizim en büyük destekçimiz Hollanda. Orası bizim üslenme ve eğitim alanımız. En fazla destek ve para aldığımız yer. Hollanda, uyuşturucu ticaretinden elde edilen paraların bir miktarını bize aktarıyordu.
• Öcalan: “1984 öncesi Türkiye içerisinde eylemler yapılması için Suriye ile görüşmelerimiz oldu. PKK’nın Suriye’deki faaliyetlerine göz yumulması karşılığında Türkiye’de yoğun eylem yapılmasını bizlerden istedi. Bizlere her türlü desteği sağladı.” (İmralı)
• Öcalan: “1988 yılında Zeydan’ı, Saddam’la görüşmek üzere gönderdim. Siyasi alanda destek görmedik. Kamp alanı olarak yardımlarını gördük. Kuzey Irak’ta yaralılarımız Süleymaniye’de bulunan hastanelerde tedavi görmektedir.” (İmralı)
• Öcalan: “İran’da örgütün sorumlusu Mahsun kod adlı bir arkadaştır. Gizli servisten Said zaman zaman yanıma geliyor ve görüşmelerimiz oluyordu. Rusya üzerinden örgüte sağlanacak silah ve diğer lojistik desteklerin güvenli bir biçimde elimize geçmesi için anlaşmaya vardık. Buna karşın Türkiye’de bulunan Hizbullah örgütünün faaliyet alanlarına müdahale etmeyecek ve silahlı çatışmaya son verilecekti. Bu anlaşma halen yürürlükte olup İran, örgütümüze barınma, silah, tedavi ve ülkesinde kamp kurma imkanı sağlamaktadır.” (İmralı)
• Öcalan: “Bekaa’da yanıma gelen emekli Albay Andonis Mastaski ve yedi kişilik heyete siyasi ve askeri yardımda bulunmalarını istedim. Yapılan görüşmelerde Lavrion kampının kullanılması, temsilciliklerin kurulması kararlaştırıldı. Buna karşın bizlerden Türkiye’de metropollerde eylemlere ağırlık verilmesini istediler. Biz de eylemlerimizi şehirlere kaydırdık… Yunanistan’da PKK’ya toplanan yardım, yıllık 1 milyon dolar civarındadır. Paranın nakli, kişilerce olmaktadır. Yunanistan’dan 1989 yılında Dimitri isminde Yunan gizli servisinin adamı yanıma geldi. Botan bölgesine geçti ve bu bölgede altı ay kadar kaldı. Ama daha sonra Yunanlılar bana sığınma hakkı vermediler ve beni Türkiye’ye sattılar.” (İmralı)

• After the second man of the PKK, Şemdin Sakık, escaped from the organization to Barzani, Öcalan became lonely and the organization started to get weaker.
• In February 16^th of 1999, Öcalan was captured to be brought to an isle in the Marmora Sea, İmralı.
• The PKK started to collapse.
• In the beginning of 2002, KADEK was founded.
• In the end of 2003, Kongra-Gel was founded.
• In 2004, Abdullah Öcalan’s brother, Osman Öcalan and his supporters separated from Kongra-Gel and established a new political party.
• Osman Öcalan: “O daha küçükken otoriter idi. PKK Başkanı Abdullah Öcalan herkesin ona tabi olmasını istiyor. Dolayısıyla PKK’deki yaşam tarzı daraltıcı oldu; çok partililiğe ve çoksesliliğe yol vermiyordu. PKK, insanların özel yaşamına izin vermiyordu ancak insanlardan fedai bir yaşam istiyordu. Mücadeleye katılan herkes sosyal yaşamı terk etmek zorundaydı. Bu durum, PKK’nin herkesi kucaklamasını engelliyordu.”
• Since he was captured in 1999, Abdullah Öcalan says that he loves his country, Turkey, and defends Kemalism.
• Osman Öcalan: “Abdullah Öcalan, partisini tamamıyla kendi etrafında topluyordu. Ancak kendisi bugün zindandadır ve hiçbir şeyin onun kontrolünün dışında gelişmesini istemiyor. PKK üzerindeki kontrolünü sürdürmek için Türkiye oligarşisiyle ilişkilerini iyi tutmak istiyor ve Kemalizmi savunuyor. Onun yüzde yüz Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin istediği doğrultusunda hareket ettiğini söylmek doğru değil. Türkiye’nin isteklerinden daha çok, o, Kürdistan özgürlük hareketinin üzerindeki kontrolünü kaybetmek istemiyor. O nedenle devleti yumuşatmak için öyle bir fikir ileriye sürüyor ki, devlet kendisine inisiyatif versin.”

• Öcalan: “Ben uzun örgüt hayatımda Kürtlerin özgürlüklerini Türkiye içerisinde bulduklarını gördüm. Bana göre Kürtlerin derdi ayrı bir devlet kurmak olamaz. Federasyon ve otonomi bir çözüm değildir. Federasyon ve otonomiden daha ileri bir çözüm demokratik sistemin kendisidir.” (İmralı)

• Öcalan: “Ben politik sosyalistim. Komünist değilim. Milliyetçiliğe karşıyım, sevmiyorum da. Ama öyle bir Kürt milliyetçiliği oluşturun ki, karşı tarafta Türk Milliyetçiliğini savunur hale gelsin.” (İmralı)
• So happened. The attacks led to a Turkish national reaction to Kurdish demands in general.

• Underestimating PKK caused the loss of valuable time.

• Öcalan: ''Bu sürdürülmemeli. Asıl görev budur. Bunu yaşamak için, şahsım için söylemiyorum, Yaşamak istiyorum demedim. Bunu önlemek lazım. Devlete yönelen tehlikenin ortadan kaldırılması gerekir. Tehlike büyüktür. Bir yargılamayla sonuç aldık diyemeyiz. Zaten benim savunmam hukuki değil, siyasidir. Ne pahasına olursa olsun mevcut çatışmayı sürdürmek amacı aşıyor. Elde edeceğin özgürlük için ulaşacağın amaç için kullandığın araç gereksizdir. Bu çatışmanın gereği yok. Bu 1990'ların başında bitmeliydi.'' (İmralı)